James A. Johnson and Jennifer L. Johnson v. Nielsen & Senior, a Utah Corporation, and Pat B. Brian : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
James A. Johnson and Jennifer L. Johnson v.
Nielsen & Senior, a Utah Corporation, and Pat B.
Brian : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard C. Coxson; Attorney for Appellants.
Arthur H. Nielsen; Marilynn P. Fineshriber; Nielsen & Senior; Michael L. Dowdle; Attorneys for
Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Johnson v. Nielsen & Senior, No. 930716 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5618
Wife IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
corporation, and PAT B. BRIAN, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 930716 - CA 
900400460CU 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE VeNOY CHRISTOFFERSEN, JUDGE, PRESIDING 
Richard C. Coxson 
Attorney at Law 
275 North Main 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Attorney for Appellants 
27374 .NEll .8500 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellee Nielsen 
& Senior 
Michael L. Dowdle 
Attorney at Law 
915 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Attorney for Appellee Brian 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JAN 1 0 1994 
J Mary T. Noonan f Clerk of the Cour 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
corporation, and PAT B. BRIAN, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 930716 - CA 
900400460CN 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE VeNOY CHRISTOFFERSEN, JUDGE, PRESIDING 
Richard C. Coxson 
Attorney at Law 
275 North Main 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellee Nielsen 
& Senior 
Michael L. Dowdle 
Attorney at Law 
915 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Attorney for Appellee Brian 
Attorney for Appellants 
27374 .NI211.8500 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
JURISDICTION STATEMENT 1 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 1 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature of the Case 3 
B. Course of Proceedings 3 
C. Statement of Material Facts 4 
1. The Adoption 4 
2. The Lawsuit 7 
3. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 13 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 15 
ARGUMENT 17 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO DISMISS 
THE CASE 17 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS' 
COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO U.R.CIV.P. 41(b) WAS PROPERLY 
WITHIN THE COURT'S DISCRETION AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED . . 18 
A. The Findings of Fact Should be Affirmed 
Because Plaintiffs Fail to Marshal on Appeal 
the Facts Which Support the Findings 18 
B. Based on Facts in the Record, the Trial 
Court's Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint was 
not an Abuse of Discretion 19 
1. The Facts of this Case Warrant Dismissal 
Under Westinghouse 21 
2. Plaintiffs' conduct has repeatedly 
delayed the movement of this matter to 
trial while Defendants have consistently 
moved the case forward 24 
-i-
27374.NI211.8500 
3. Plaintiffs' failure to prosecute the case 
with diligence caused difficulty and 
prejudice to Defendants 26 
4. Dismissal will not result in injustice to 
Plaintiffs 26 
C. Dismissal of this Case Was Consistent with 
Prior Decisions of Utah Courts 27 
POINT III: NO CAUSES OF ACTION REMAIN FOR WHICH 
PLAINTIFFS CAN RECOVER EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES . . . 29 
CONCLUSION 30 
ADDENDUM 
A. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) 
B. Judgment of Dismissal, April 6, 1993 (R.1879) 
C. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, April 6, 1993 
(R.1877) 
D. Denial of Interlocutory Appeal, May 21, 1992 
E. Affidavit of Larry L. Whyte, with exhibits (R.1995) 
F. Plaintiffs' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
unsigned (R.1891) 
G. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), with 
memorandum (R.18 0 2) 
H. Memorandum Decision, May 28, 1992 (R.1713) 
I. Order Extending Discovery Cutoff, May 14, 1992 (R.1687) 
J. Motion to Extend Discovery, May 5, 1992 (R.1666) 
K. Minute Entry, July 12, 1991 (R.898) 
27374.NI211.8500 
- i i -
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
Charlie Brown Const. Co. v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 
740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App. 1987) 1, 19, 20, 26 
Country Meadows v. Dept. of Health, 851 P.2d 1212 
(Utah App. 1993) 1 
Haaan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991) 18 
Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. v. Amity Mutual 
Irrigation Co.. 698 P.2d 1340 (Colo. 1985) 19 
Maxfield v. Fishier. 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975) 20 
Maxfield v. Rushton. 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1989) . 2, 14, 15, 
27-29 
Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State University. 
813 P.2d 1216 (Utah App. 1991) 20, 27, 29 
Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill. 849 P.2d 602 
(Utah App. 1993) lf 19 
Riche v. Riche. 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989) 18 
Slatterv v. Covev & Co.. 857 P.2d 243 (Utah App. 1993) . . . 18 
Walton v. Walton. 814 P.2d 619 (Utah App. 1993) 18, 19 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311 
(Utah App. 1991) 18 
Westinghouse Elect. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen 
Contractors. Inc.. 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) 14, 15, 20, 21, 
27-29 
Charlie Brown Const. Co. v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 
740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App. 1987) 1, 16, 18, 24 
Country Meadows v. Dept. of Health. 851 P.2d 1212 
(Utah App. 1993) 1, 2, 16 
Dept. of Social Services v. Romero. 609 P.2d 1323 
(Utah 1982) 1, 16 
Hagan v. Hagan. 810 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991) 16, 17 
-iii-
27374.N1211.8500 
In re Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989) 17 
Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. v. Amity Mutual 
Irrigation Co., 698 P.2d 1340 (Colo. 1985) 18 
Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975) 19 
Maxfield v. Rushton. 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1989) . . 2, 24-27 
Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d 1216 
(Utah App. 1991) 1, 2, 16, 19, 24, 26 
Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602 
(Utah App. 1993) 18 
Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989) 17 
Slatterv v. Covey & Co., 857 P.2d 243 (Utah App. 1993) . . . 17 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987) 17 
Walton v. Walton, 814 P.2d 619 (Utah App. 1993) 16-18 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 
(Utah App. 1991) 17 
Westinqhouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen 
Contractor. Inc.. 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) . . 1, 2, 16, 19, 
24-26 
27374.N1211.8500 
- iv-
JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
Plaintiffs appeal an Order of Dismissal entered by the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, Utah County, State of Utah. The Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction of this civil appeal under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 
(1992), and has transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to dismiss 
Plaintiffs' case when Plaintiffs' petition for interlocutory appeal 
had been denied over six months before the dismissal. 
Standard of Review: 
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to dismiss 
the case is a determination of law and is reviewed by 
this Court for correctness. Ohline Corp. v. Granite 
Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 605 (Utah App. 1993). Plaintiffs' 
argument was not raised in the trial court. 
2• Whether the trial court abused its broad discretion when 
it dismissed Plaintiffs' case, pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 41(b), for 
failure to prosecute the case to trial. 
Standard of Review; 
Dismissal under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute 
is a decision within the broad discretion of the trial 
court. This Court will not interfere with that decision 
unless it clearly appears that the court has abused its 
discretion and there is a likelihood an injustice has 
resulted. Country Meadows v. Dept. of Health, 851 P.2d 
1212, 1214 (Utah App. 1993); Charlie Brown Const. Co. v. 
Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App. 
1987) . 
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3. Whether the trial court's partial summary judgment 
dismissing Plaintiffs' claims for damages for emotional distress 
was rendered moot when the court dismissed Plaintiffs' case under 
Utah R.Civ.P. 41(b). 
Standard of Review: 
Whether an interlocutory ruling below is now moot is 
an original determination by the appellate court without 
regard to the rulings below. When the trial court has 
properly exercised its discretion under Rule 41(b), the 
appellate court will not review prior interlocutory 
rulings. Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Utah R.Civ.P. 41(b) as set forth in Defendants' Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants disagree with Plaintiffs' statement of the case, 
and submit the following statement which accurately reflects the 
facts and proceedings herein. In doing sof Defendants refer to the 
Record as "R. " (citing the page); depositions are referred to 
by deponent, volume and page number, i.e. " Depo., Vol. , 
p. "; and documents from the record which are contained in 
Defendants' Addendum are arranged, insofar as possible, in record 
number order and referred to as "Ad. ." 
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A. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiffs filed this action against Pat B. Brian and Nielsen 
& Senior for alleged malpractice by Defendants as attorneys while 
representing Plaintiffs, the adopting parents in an adoption. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint asserted five claims for 
relief, framed as (1) "breach of contract," (2) "professional 
negligence," (3) "negligent infliction of emotional distress," 
(4) "intentional infliction (by Pat B. Brian only) of emotional 
distress," and (5) "negligent misrepresentation." 
Partial summary judgment by the trial court dismissed 
Plaintiffs' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent 
misrepresentation. [R.1371, R.1498, R.1616] 
After over two and one-half years, seven attorneys for 
Plaintiffs and continued nonaction by Plaintiffs, Defendants moved 
with supporting memorandum to dismiss Plaintiffs' action pursuant 
to Utah R.Civ.P. 41(b), for failure to prosecute the case with 
diligence. [Ad. G] Oral argument was held by telephone 
conference, during which both parties made numerous factual 
representations to the court. The telephone argument was not 
recorded. Following oral argument, the trial court granted 
Defendants' motion, and findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
an order of dismissal were entered on April 6, 1993. [Ad. B, C] 
Plaintiffs' separate motions for new trial were denied by Judge 
-3-
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Christoffersen. [R.2167, 2173] Plaintiffs filed this appeal. 
[R.2177] 
C. Statement of Material Facts 
Although Plaintiffs attack the findings, they fail to marshal 
the evidence supporting the findings and show its inadequacy as a 
matter of law. Instead, Plaintiffs rely upon their own selective 
version of the "facts." Defendants therefore state the pertinent 
facts supporting the dismissal as primarily contained within the 
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. [R.1877-1861; 
Ad. C] References to the specific Findings in Addendum C are 
"Finding No. ." 
1. The Adoption. 
In January, 1986, Defendant Pat B. Brian was a member of 
Nielsen & Senior and had not yet been appointed to the district 
court bench. He was retained by Plaintiffs to represent them in 
adopting a child to be born in June 1986. [Finding Nos. 1, 2] 
Plaintiffs had already made arrangements with the expectant mother 
to adopt her baby. [Finding No. 1; James Johnson Depo., Vol. Ill, 
pp. 538-44] Mr. Brian met with the birth mother in Utah and 
confirmed her preliminary commitment to place her child for 
adoption by Plaintiffs. [Finding No. 1] Thereafter, the mother 
traveled to Texas where she remained until the baby was born. 
[Finding No. 2] 
27374 .NI211.8500 
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The child was born on June 25, 1986, in Texas. [Finding 
No. 2] On June 27, 1986, the child and mother returned to the 
State of Utah and the baby was delivered to Plaintiffs. [Finding 
No. 2] Since that datef the child has never been out of the 
custody, care and control of Plaintiffs. [Finding No. 3] 
In December 1986, a petition for adoption by Plaintiffs 
was filed by Defendants as attorneys for Plaintiffs. [Finding 
No. 5] Following Defendant Brian's appointment as a Judge of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Utah in May 1987, Nielsen & Senior 
continued to seek entry of a final decree of adoption. [Finding 
No. 6] Defendants' efforts to obtain the natural mother's 
statutory consent were evaded by the natural mother. On June 23, 
1987, the birth mother informed Nielsen & Senior that she would not 
give her consent to the adoption and wished to regain custody of 
the child. [Finding No. 7] 
When Plaintiffs were immediately informed of the birth 
mother's intentionf they discharged Nielsen & Senior and hired 
another attorney, who thereafter represented them in the adoption 
proceedings. [Finding No. 8] Between July lf 1987f and mid-
October 1987, Plaintiffs' attorney negotiated with the birth mother 
and agreed to pay her approximately $10,000.00 for her alleged 
expenses incurredf including attorney's fees. The birth mother 
then executed her formal consent to the adoption. [Finding No. 9] 
On October 16, 1987, the decree of adoption was entered by the 
court and the adoption by Plaintiffs was complete. [Finding 
No. 10] 
-5-
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In November 1987f Plaintiffs' attorneyf Mark F. Robinson, 
contacted Defendants regarding Plaintiffs' claims for expenses 
allegedly incurred by Plaintiffs in finalizing the adoption. 
[Finding No. 11] Alsof Plaintiffs personally wrote separately to 
Mr. Brian and Nielsen & Senior, demanding damages for the alleged 
improper handling of the adoption. [James Johnson Depo., Vol. VI, 
Exh. 13; R.961] 
Thereafter, Plaintiffs retained the law firm of Howard, 
Lewis & Petersen of Provo to represent them. In August 1988, 
D. David Lambert contacted Defendants to assert Plaintiffs' claims 
regarding the adoption. [Finding No. 12] Defendants met with Mr. 
Lambert to discuss possible resolution, but no resolution was 
reached. [Finding No. 12] In February 1989, Plaintiffs terminated 
Mr. Lambert's representation. [Finding No. 12; see also James 
Johnson Depo., Vol. VI, Exh. 14] 
After Mr. Lambert's termination, Plaintiffs met with 
Defendants in further negotiations. [Finding No. 13] Plaintiffs' 
demands increased. Plaintiffs attempted to involve LDS Church 
officials and the news media in publicizing their claims. [Finding 
No. 13] During this period, Plaintiffs vacillated in claiming that 
they were acting pro se or that they had retained counsel. 
[Finding No. 13] Among other activities, they contacted the news 
media, circulated papers and materials among many lawyers — both 
in and without the state — and aired their grievances through the 
newspapers and over television, using the alias of "Johnson," and 
filed a complaint with the State Bar. [James Johnson Depo., 
-6-
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pp. 12, 15-38] Mr. Brad England, an attorney in Salt Lakef 
reviewed the documents they sent him and "qualified" himself to 
represent Plaintiffs, but Mr. Johnson did not "feel comfortable 
about where he was (he off iced in the same building as did 
Defendant Nielsen & Senior) and what his connection was with 
Nielsen & Senior." [James Johnson Depo., p. 16] Mr. Johnson 
further testified that law firms in Las Vegas and Arizona indicated 
that they would represent him. [James Johnson Depo., p. 16] 
2. The Lawsuit. 
On June 22, 1990, Plaintiffs filed their original 
complaint, pro se. The complaint asserted claims against 
Defendants for breach of contract, negligence, violation of child 
placement laws, breach of covenants of good faith and fair dealing, 
misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. [Finding No. 14; 
R.12] Plaintiffs claimed damages in an undisclosed amount. 
[Finding No. 14] On July 2, 1990, Plaintiffs filed their first 
amended complaint, which generally alleged the same claims for 
relief. [Finding No. 15; R.26] Plaintiffs also sought and 
obtained permission to proceed under the "assumed names" of James 
and Jennifer Johnson. [R.85] 
D. Lanny Waite, a Las Vegas attorney, was among those 
sought out by Plaintiffs. [Finding No. 17] In July 1990, 
Mr. Waite wrote to Defendants, claiming to represent Plaintiffs and 
demanding payment of $180,000.00. Mr. Waite further expressed his 
-7-
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"anticipation" that the media attention already given would 
increase due to Judge Brian's judicial position. [Finding No. 17] 
Once again, Defendants rejected the claim. Plaintiffs later stated 
that Mr. Waite was not going to represent them. [Finding No. 17] 
On July 30, 1990, Nielsen & Senior gave notice to take 
Plaintiffs' depositions, beginning August 17, 1990. [Finding 
No. 18; R.91-90] On August 16, 1990, the day before the scheduled 
depositions, Jerold D. Conder and Peter L. Rognlie of Conder & 
Wangsgard appeared as counsel for Plaintiffs. They requested that 
the depositions be postponed until they could become familiar with 
the case. [Finding No. 18] 
On September 12, 1990, Conder & Wangsgard filed a second 
amended complaint, alleging professional malpractice, breach of 
contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress (as to 
Defendant Brian only), negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
and negligent misrepresentation. [Finding No. 19] Defendants then 
filed their answers. [R.237, R.250, R.266] 
Plaintiff James Johnson finally submitted to have his 
deposition taken, commencing November 28, 1990 (more than three 
months after it was originally scheduled). [Finding No. 20] The 
deposition continued for three days, (with frequent interruptions 
to allow Plaintiff to confer with his attorney), at which time 
disagreement developed between Plaintiffs and their counsel 
involving the testimony being given by Plaintiff James Johnson. 
[Finding No. 20; James Johnson Depo., Vol. Ill, pp. 580-581] The 
deposition was adjourned on November 30th by Plaintiffs' attorney 
-8-
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when Mr. Johnson claimed he did not "feel very good right now." 
[Finding No. 20; James Johnson Depo., Vol. Ill, pp. 582-585] 
Later, Plaintiffs' attorney claimed Mr. Johnson was unable to 
continue his deposition for mental health reasons. [Letter 
(R.276-277)] 
In January 1991, Conder & Wangsgard withdrew as counsel 
for Plaintiffs. [R.284] On January 18, 1991, Defendant Nielsen 
& Senior gave notice to appoint counsel or to appear in person. 
[Finding No. 21; R.282] Plaintiffs did neither. 
In March 1991, attorney David R. Irvine wrote to Nielsen 
& Senior, suggesting his possible appearance as counsel for 
Plaintiffs. A possibility of settlement was discussed by 
telephone. [Finding No. 22; Whyte Affidavit, pp. 4-5; Ad. E; 
R.1995] Notwithstanding his letter and the preliminary 
discussions, Mr. Irvine never entered an appearance for Plaintiffs. 
[Finding No. 22] 
In April 1991, attorney Darwin C. Fisher entered his 
appearance for Plaintiffs — the day before the court's scheduling 
conference on April 16, 1991. [Finding No. 23; R.867] The 
conference was continued at Mr. Fisher's request [Finding No. 23], 
and was rescheduled by the court for June 26, 1991, in Logan, Utah. 
[Finding No. 24; R.871] Again, the hearing was continued to 
July 1, 1991 [R.884], and was finally held on July 12, 1991. The 
court found that Mr. Fisher was not ready at the hearing to engage 
in any meaningful discussion of a resolution of the case due to his 
27374.NI211.8500 
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lack of familiarity with the case. [Finding No. 24; see also 
Transcript of Hearing, July 12f 1991] 
Also at the July 12th conference, the court fixed 
November 1, 1991, to designate Plaintiffs' expert witnesses. 
Discovery cutoff was set for December 30, 1991. A pre-trial 
conference was scheduled for January 24, 1992, and the trial was 
rescheduled for February 17-28, 1992. [Ad. K (Minute Entry R.898)] 
The parties agreed, and the court ordered, that an agreed 
pre-trial order be submitted prior to trial by January 13, 1992. 
[Whyte Affidavit, p. 13; Ad. E; Finding No. 25; R.878, R.908] 
Later, when Defendants prepared a proposed pre-trial order, their 
repeated efforts to obtain the approval of Plaintiffs' attorneys 
were unsuccessful. [Finding No. 25; Whyte Affidavit, p. 13; Ad. E] 
Plaintiffs never submitted a proposed pre-trial order to Defendants 
or to the court. [Finding No. 25] 
From December 1990 through October 1991, Defendants 
attempted to resume Plaintiffs' depositions. Plaintiff James 
Johnson did not submit himself to continue his deposition until 
October 10, 1991, almost a year after it had begun. [Finding 
No. 26] In addition to the prior excuse of Plaintiffs' poor 
health, Mr. Fisher claimed that he was still insufficiently 
familiar with the facts of the case. [Finding No. 26; Whyte 
Affidavit, pp. 6-8; Ad. E] The deposition examination was 
completed on October 11, 1991. [Finding No. 26; James Johnson 
Depo., Vols. IV and V] 
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In January 1992, Pat Brian was allowed to and filed a 
counterclaim against Plaintiffs for defamation. [Finding No. 28; 
Counterclaim (R.1484)] Upon Plaintiffs' motion, the trial set for 
February 18, 1992, was continued to May 5-14, 1992. [Finding 
No. 28; R.1506] 
Upon entry by the court of an order granting Defendants' 
partial summary judgment dismissing the cause of action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiffs moved for a 
new trial and for extension of the discovery period. [R.1460] 
On March 18, 1992, the court denied Plaintiffs' motion 
for a new trial, but extended the date for discovery up to fourteen 
days prior to the May 5th trial date. [R.1623] Following this 
order, in a telephone conference with the court, Plaintiffs again 
moved to extend the discovery cut-off. The extension was granted 
to May 1, 1992 — three days before trial. [Ad. I; R.1687] 
On April 3, 1992, Plaintiffs petitioned for interlocutory 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from the partial summary judgment 
entered by the trial court on January 7 and March 18, 1992. 
[R.1645-1630] The trial court continued the trial without date. 
[R.1647] The Utah Supreme Court denied interlocutory appeal on 
May 21, 1992. Notice of denial was given to Plaintiffs' attorney. 
[Ad. D] 
On April 30, 1992, Plaintiffs sought permission to depose 
Defendants' expert witness after the May 1st discovery cut-off. 
[R.1657] On May 5, 1992, Plaintiffs again moved to extend 
discovery, claiming discovery delays. [Ad. J; R.1666] 
-11-
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On May 20, 1992, in response to Plaintiffs' motions for 
additional timef the trial judge ruled that although discovery had 
been a problem and extension after extension had been given, "the 
court does not plan to deviate any further from the order that sets 
discovery cut-off dates. No exception will be given." [Memorandum 
Decision, Ad. H; R.1713] The order to this effect was entered July 
23, 1992. [R.1718] 
In May 1992, Plaintiffs took the deposition of 
Defendants' expert witness, Brent Hoggan. [Finding No. 39] With 
the court's permission, Defendants subpoenaed Lizanne Magleby (the 
child's birth mother) for her deposition on June 30, 1992, and gave 
due notice to Plaintiffs. [Finding No. 37] Plaintiffs again moved 
to postpone the deposition on the grounds that Plaintiffs' counsel 
would be unable to attend [Finding No. 37], but the court ordered 
that the deposition proceed. [Finding No. 37; Order, 8/24/92; 
R.1726] 
During the June 1992 telephone hearing, the court also 
ordered that the trial would be held on November 2-13, 1992. 
[R.1983] Judge Christoffersen instructed that this new trial date 
be inserted in the "agreed" pre-trial order. Plaintiffs did not 
object to the new trial date. 
The deposition of Ms. Magleby was taken by Defendants on 
June 30, 1992, as noticed. Thereafter, nothing was done by 
Plaintiffs to advance their claims or to prepare for trial. 
[Finding No. 40] 
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Plaintiffs' attorney, Darwin C. Fisherf was to prepare 
the pre-trial orderf to be agreed to by all parties. Howeverf 
Mr. Fisher failed to do so. Plaintiffs did not do anything to 
prepare a pre-trial order as the court had ordered in July 1991. 
Defendants prepared and submitted to Plaintiffs' attorney several 
drafts of a proposed pre-trial order. Notwithstanding a prior 
stipulation, Mr. Fisher refused to agree to any of the proposed 
pre-trial orders and would not cooperate in preparing a stipulated 
order. [Stipulation, R.878; Finding No. 25; Whyte Affidavit, p.13] 
3. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
On or about October 7, 1992, Darwin C. Fisher sought 
leave to withdraw as Plaintiffs' attorney. [R.1737] Defendant 
Brian opposed the motion, arguing that further delay prejudiced 
him. [Finding No. 41; R.1754] The court allowed Mr. Fisher to 
withdraw on November 19, 1992, observing that Plaintiffs' present 
attorney, Mr. Coxson, had already entered his appearance on 
October 26, 1992. [Finding No. 41; R.1780, 1756] Mr. Coxson is 
Plaintiffs' seventh attorney. Of course, the November trial date 
was also vacated. 
Plaintiffs' new attorney failed to move the case toward 
trial until after Defendants filed their Rule 41(b) motion to 
dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for lack of prosecution on 
February 3, 1993. [Ad. G; R.1802] No action had been taken by 
Plaintiffs' attorney to move the matter to trial since May 1992. 
In support of the motion, Defendants filed their memorandum, 
-13-
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recounting the continuances, lengthy delaysf and lack of 
prosecution by Plaintiffs and their successive attorneys. [Ad. G; 
R.1800] 
Plaintiffs filed an opposing memorandum and moved to 
"strike" the motion. [Motion, R.1812-1813]. Contemporaneously, on 
February 17, 1993, Plaintiffs served Defendants with numerous 
requests for admissions which, the court later observed, violated 
the ordered discovery cutoff, were duplicative, and evidenced a 
total lack of familiarity with the case. [Certificate of Service, 
R.1805; Finding No. 45; Ad. C, R.1877] 
When Plaintiffs' counsel attempted to continue the 
hearing on the motion to dismiss, the parties agreed to argue the 
motion by conference telephone call. That conference call was held 
on March 11, 1993, with the court, Mr. Coxson, and Defendants' 
attorneys present. All depositions were ordered published and made 
available to the court. [Ad. C, R.1877] 
Following arguments by all counsel, Judge Christoffersen 
outlined the factors in Westinahouse Elect. Supply Co., infra, and 
Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1989) and reviewed the 
history of the case. [Ad. C, R.1877] The court then concluded 
that Plaintiffs' conduct justified dismissal of the case with 
prejudice, and granted Defendants' motion. [Ad. B; R.1879] The 
court requested Defendants' to prepare formal findings and 
conclusions and judgment in conformity with the court's verbal 
decision. Defendants' counsel did so. [Ad. B, C; R.1877, R.1879] 
Plaintiffs' counsel likewise submitted their version of the court's 
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findings of fact and conclusions of law which essentially parallel 
the findings and conclusions entered by the court. [Ad. F] The 
final dismissal and findings were entered April 6, 1993. 
Plaintiffs' motion for new trial was denied, and 
Plaintiffs filed this appeal. [Notice, R.2177] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Utah Supreme Court denied Plaintiffs' petition for 
interlocutory appeal in May 1992, long before Defendants' motion to 
dismiss for lack of diligent prosecution was filed in February 
1993. The trial court clearly had jurisdiction to dismiss 
Plaintiffs' complaint for lack of diligent prosecution when 
Plaintiffs did virtually nothing from the time the Utah Supreme 
Court denied interlocutory appeal in May 1992 until February 1993. 
Plaintiffs never previously challenged the trial court's 
jurisdiction in their objections, motion to strikef nor motion for 
new trial. We submit that Plaintiffs' contention now that the 
court lacked jurisdictionf notwithstanding the clear record to the 
contrary, raises substantial question as to Plaintiffs' knowledge 
of this case, the frivolous nature of this appeal, and counsel's 
obligations to this Court under Utah R. App. P. 40(a). 
2. The trial court properly exercised its considerable 
discretion when it considered the appropriate factors under 
Westinghouse Elect. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractors, Inc., 
544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975), and Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 
(Utah App. 1989), namely: 
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a. Plaintiffs delayed and prolonged prosecution of the 
case through regular replacement of counsel, continual attempts to 
extend cut-off and deadline dates, expand discovery beyond the 
issues, introduce irrelevant issues, and evidence an intention to 
further delay the prosecution of the case. 
b. While Defendants continually advanced the case 
forward to trial, Plaintiffs failed to move their case forward. 
Plaintiffs have obstructed Defendants' and the court's efforts in 
virtually every instance. 
c. Although all parties have been prejudiced by the 
delays, the fault has been that of Plaintiffs' in every instance, 
as found by the court in detail. 
d. Plaintiffs have not suffered any injustice. The 
only proper claim was for alleged negligent delay in obtaining an 
adoption decree, yet Plaintiffs have not suffered any damage nor 
increased monetary cost by virtue of any such delay. 
e. Plaintiffs have delayed resolution of their claims 
until more than five and one-half years after the claims were first 
made, two and one-half years after the complaint was filed, and 
after four continued trial dates. Plaintiffs have failed to 
marshal the evidence before the court as to the proceedings herein, 
hearings, the verbal representations to the court by Plaintiffs' 
counsel, and the documents filed herein. Instead of showing that 
there is nothing in the record to support the trial court's 
exercise of discretion, Plaintiffs' argument relies on the self-
27374.NI21I.8500 
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serving affidavit of former counsel who seeks to shift 
responsibility onto others. 
3. The issue of emotional distress damages is not properly 
before the Court because the affirmance of the trial court's 
dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint is dispositive of all issues in 
the case. When the trial court exercised its considerable 
discretion to dismiss the case in light of Plaintiffs' dilatory 
conduct, all prior interlocutory decisions by the court were 
rendered moot. Because the final dismissal was not an abuse of 
discretion, this Court need not even consider whether or not the 
earlier partial summary judgment was proper. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO DISMISS THE CASE 
Plaintiffs' claim that "[n]o response to the Motion for 
Interlocutory Order was ever entered by the Utah Supreme Court in 
this matter prior to the dismissal of this case with prejudice" is 
totally incorrect. On May 21, 1992, the Utah Supreme Court entered 
an order denying Plaintiffs' petition, which stated: "THIS DAY, 
Petition for interlocutory appeal having been heretofore 
considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in the 
premises, it is ordered that an interlocutory appeal be, and the 
same is, denied." [Ad. D] 
Plaintiffs were well aware of this fact. Indeed, Finding 
No. 32 of their findings of fact submitted to the court on April 2, 
-17-
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1993f states: "The Utah Supreme Court denied plaintiff's Petition 
for Interlocutory Appeal on May 21, 1992." [R.1891] 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS' 
COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO U.R.CIV.P. 41(b) WAS PROPERLY 
WITHIN THE COURT'S DISCRETION AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
A. The Findings of Fact Should be Affirmed Because Plaintiffs 
Fail to Marshal on Appeal the Facts Which Support the 
Findings. 
On appeal, a trial court's findings of fact will not be 
disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. "An appellant 
challenging the factual findings faces a substantial burden. The 
trial court's findings of fact will be affirmed if they are 'based 
on sufficient evidence, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's construction.'" Slatterv v. Covey 
& Co., 857 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah App. 1993), citing West Valley City 
v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991). 
The party seeking to overturn the trial court's findings has 
the burden of marshaling the evidence in support of the findings 
and then demonstrating that, despite such evidence, the findings 
are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous. Slatterv, at 246; 
Walton v. Walton, 814 P.2d 619, 620-21 (Utah App. 1993); Hagan v. 
Haqan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991); Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 
465, 468 (Utah App. 1989); West Valley City, at 1313. 
In the Walton case, the court held: "If the appellant fails 
to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the 
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record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a 
review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and 
the application of that law in the case." Id., at 620-21. 
In the instant appealf Plaintiffs have neither marshaled the 
evidence which supports the trial court's findings, nor 
demonstrated that such findings are clearly erroneous. Instead, 
they have merely selected facts most favorable to their case, 
rearguing those facts to this Court on appeal. Because Plaintiffs 
have failed to satisfy their burden to marshal the evidence, this 
Court must assume the correctness of and accept the trial court's 
findings of fact, and proceed to a "review of the accuracy of lower 
court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the 
case." Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d at 606 (Utah App. 
1993) . 
B. Based on Facts in the Record, the Trial Court's Dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' Complaint was not an Abuse of Discretion. 
Not only do Plaintiffs have the burden of marshaling the 
evidence, but also to show that the dismissal of their case was an 
abuse of discretion by the lower court. 
Rule 41(b) empowers this Court to dismiss an action, with 
prejudice and on the merits, for failure of the Plaintiff to 
prosecute. "The burden is upon the Plaintiff to prosecute a case 
in due course without unusual or unreasonable delay." Charlie 
Brown Const. Co., Inc. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 
(Utah App. 1987) (quoting Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. v. Amity 
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Mutual Irrigation Co., 698 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Colo. 1985)). 
Plaintiffs must "prosecute their claims with due diligence, or 
accept the penalty of dismissal." Charlie Brown Const., at 1370, 
(quoting Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah 1975)). 
Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within the broad 
discretion of the trial court. Id. This Court has held that it 
will not interfere with the trial court's decision unless it 
clearly appears that the Court has abused its discretion and that 
there is a likelihood that injustice resulted. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court provided the trial courts with guidance 
on Rule 41(b) dismissal in Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. 
Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). In that 
case, the Court reviewed a Rule 41(b) dismissal for failure to 
prosecute and identified the factors to be considered in 
determining whether such a dismissal is appropriate. Those factors 
were articulated recently by the Court of Appeals as follows: 
The Westinghouse court delineated five factors in 
addition to the length of time elapsed to determine the 
propriety of a dismissal for failure to prosecute: (1) 
the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each 
party has had to move the case forward; (3) what each 
party has done to move the case forward; (4) the amount 
of difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to 
the other side; and (5) "most important, whether 
injustice may result from the dismissal." 
Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 
(Utah App. 1991). 
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1. The Facts of this Case Warrant Dismissal Under 
Westinghouse. 
In determining whether to grant Defendants' motion to 
dismiss in this case, the trial court applied the Westinghouse 
factors to the established facts in the record, as follows: 
a. With respect to Factor (1), lapse of time, the trial 
court determined that a considerable lapse of time occurred in this 
case, almost five and one-half (5 1/2) years since the claims were 
first made by Plaintiffs against Defendants, and over two and one-
half (2 1/2) years between the filing of the original complaint and 
the 41(b) motion. While this was not the deciding factor in the 
court's analysis, it was of significance to the court. 
b. With respect to Factor (2), conduct of the parties, 
the trial court concluded that Defendants consistently and 
continuously attempted to move the case forward through conducting 
discovery, narrowing of the scope of the case through pre-trial 
motions, and cooperating with the court and opposing counsel in 
adherence to court cut-off dates and deadlines. In contrast, 
Plaintiffs persisted in delaying and prolonging the prosecution of 
the case through the replacement of counsel, requiring re-education 
of new counsel in each instance, and through continual and 
persistent attempts to extend cut-off dates and deadlines, to 
expand the scope of discovery and to introduce new issues into the 
case. Weighing the conduct of the parties, the court concluded 
that this factor weighed heavily in favor of Defendants. 
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c.& d. With respect to Factors (3) and (4), opportunity 
to move the case forward and actions of the parties to do so, the 
trial court determined that all parties in this case had equal 
opportunity to move the case forward to trial. For the same 
reasons as stated in subparagraph (b) above, the court concluded 
that Defendants took advantage of their opportunity to move the 
case forward. In contrast, and in the face of their primary burden 
to do so, Plaintiffs failed to move the case forward to trial and, 
rather, obstructed Defendants' and the court's efforts to do so in 
virtually every instance. During the period of time that the 
instant case was pending before the lower court, Plaintiffs had a 
personal injury action pending in which they had other counsel 
involving an automobile accident, which Plaintiff James Johnson 
claimed caused him serious emotional distress. That case was tried 
to a jury in April 1992. A verdict of no cause of action was 
appealed and transferred to this Court on October 5, 1992 (Case No. 
920694). The same attorney who ultimately withdrew in this case 
represented Plaintiffs in the trial and was replaced by Plaintiffs' 
present attorney on September 14, 1992. Weighing the opportunity 
to move the case forward and the actions of the parties in doing 
so, the court properly determined that this factor weighed heavily 
in favor of Defendants. 
e. With respect to Factor (5) , difficulty and prejudice 
of the parties, the court stated that both sides of this case have 
been prejudiced by the failure to move this case toward trial. The 
court concluded, however, that the fault for the difficulty and 
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prejudice suffered by the parties is Plaintiffs' in every instance. 
Plaintiffs' actions in the constant replacement of counsel, and 
attempts to delay and broaden the scope of discovery and issues in 
the case up to the time the motion to dismiss was filed are 
responsible for the difficulty and prejudice suffered by the 
parties. Weighing the difficulty and prejudice to the parties and 
to the court, the court concluded that this factor weighed heavily 
in favor of Defendants. 
f. With respect to Factor (6), injustice which may 
result from dismissal, the court concluded that no substantial 
injustice would result to the Plaintiffs in this case. The issue 
remaining to be litigated was the claimed negligence and/or breach 
of contract by Defendants in connection with the delayed adoption 
by Plaintiffs of the minor child. The child has never been out of 
Plaintiffs' custody, and the adoption was finalized within three 
and one-half (3 1/2) months of the making of the original claim by 
the natural mother to obtain custody. Only minor monetary costs 
could have been incurred by Plaintiffs with new counsel to finalize 
the adoption. Even these amounts are disputed by Defendants as 
having been unnecessarily incurred, since Nielsen & Senior could 
have completed the adoption. The court further determined that 
Plaintiffs' conduct was the cause of the delay, difficulty and 
prejudice suffered in this case, and that no substantial injustice 
would result from the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims with 
prejudice. 
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In light of the abovef the trial court properly concluded 
that dismissal was not an abuse of its discretion. 
2. Plaintiffsr conduct has repeatedly delayed the movement 
of this matter to trial while Defendants have 
consistently moved the case forward. 
As the facts clearly illustrate, Plaintiffs failed to 
move the case forward. Plaintiffs were represented by several 
successive attorneys in this matter, the withdrawal of each 
resulting in delay. Plaintiffs amended their complaint twice, and 
three times requested a continuance of a trial setting. Plaintiff 
James Johnson's deposition was rescheduled several times and 
finally completed more than a year after noticed. Although 
Plaintiffs claim his deposition delay was due to his emotional 
distress, he was never treated by a medical doctor. The 
"physician" who is referred to in Plaintiffs' brief is a 
psychologist — the same person who allegedly treated him in his 
personal injury case and testified at the trial of that matter. 
Mr. Johnson's deposition in this case was recessed at the request 
of his then attorney because of Plaintiff's inconsistent 
statements, which were particularly noted by his attorney, as 
follows: 
Mr. [Johnson], I need to instruct you that Counsel is 
asking questions; you're under oath to answer those 
questions, and you need to answer those questions to the 
best of your ability. As I have told you both on and off 
the record, if you're unable to answer a question for 
whatever reason, whether it's your own emotional state of 
mind, your physical condition and your stamina, whatever 
it might be, pure lapse of memory; I'm asking you to 
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state that and state that on the record prior to 
answering questions. 
We're not accomplishing anything here for any of us 
— at least for our side of the lawsuit, I should say — 
when you attempt to give an answer and then later your 
recollection becomes better or worse. 
[James Johnson Depo., p 581] 
In April 1992, Plaintiffs filed with the Utah Supreme 
Court a petition for interlocutory appeal which required that the 
trial setting for May 1992 be stricken. Although the petition was 
denied and Plaintiffs were free to proceed with their case, 
Plaintiffs did not take the necessary steps toward trial, 
specifically to submit a pretrial order as directed by the court or 
to confirm the trial date. Plaintiffs took no action at all after 
May 1992 until Defendants' motion to dismiss was filed, and then 
acted only by way of filing lengthy requests for admissions, 
evidencing an intent to revive discovery and enlarge the issues to 
be tried. 
Even this abbreviated listing of facts demonstrates 
Plaintiffs' lack of determination to move the case forward to 
trial. Defendants, however, proceeded with the case, pursuing 
discovery, narrowing the issues for trial by motion, and 
consistently representing to the court their readiness for trial. 
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3. Plaintiffs7 failure to prosecute the case with diligence 
caused difficulty and prejudice to Defendants. 
Plaintiffs' numerous changes of counsel, amendments to 
pleadings, reluctant compliance with Defendants' discovery 
requests, and requests for continuance of the trial date greatly 
increased Defendants' burden of defending this action. Defendants 
were deprived of the benefits of a prompt resolution of the claims 
against them. Delay promised to make the presentation of evidence 
at trial more difficult, prejudicing Defendants, whose defenses 
required the accurate testimony of third parties whose recollection 
would be clouded or who might become unavailable with the passage 
of time. Obviously, delay unnecessarily increased the cost of 
defense. 
Defendants lived more than five and one-half years with 
Plaintiffs' threats and harassment. Defendants were prepared to 
respond to Plaintiffs' claims on the merits, but Plaintiffs delayed 
every effort to place the matter before the court. 
4. Dismissal will not result in injustice to Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs must diligently prosecute their claims or 
accept the penalty of dismissal. Charlie Brown Const., 740 P.2d 
at 1370. Such dismissal is not unjust when it is Plaintiffs' 
conduct that invites or avoids dismissal. Plaintiffs in this case 
showed lack of diligence in getting their claims resolved on the 
merits. Presumably, they were aware of the consequences of their 
lack of diligence. 
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Defendants acknowledge that this Court must "balance the 
need to expedite litigation and efficiently utilize judicial 
resources with the need to allow parties to have their day in 
court." Meadow Fresh Farms, 813 P.2d at 1219. Notwithstanding, 
when the facts of this matter are evaluated against the factors set 
forth in Westinghouse. dismissal was clearly in order. 
C. Dismissal of this Case Was Consistent with Prior Decisions of 
Utah Courts. 
In Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1989), the 
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of Maxfield's 
complaint for lack of prosecution. The facts considered by this 
Court were these: The plaintiff filed his complaint in 1980 and 
amended it twice, each time adding new theories of the case. Id., 
at 238-239. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment three times 
and filed a petition for interlocutory appeal from the trial 
court's refusal to grant it. The petition was denied by the 
Supreme Court. Two of the plaintiff's attorneys withdrew from 
representation. The plaintiff objected to all three of the trial 
dates set. When the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint a third 
time and, at the same timef his third attorney moved to withdraw, 
the trial court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute the 
action in a timely manner. Id., at 239. 
This Court reviewed the facts in light of the Westinghouse 
factors, stating that "there is more to consider in determining if 
a dismissal for failure to prosecute is proper than merely the 
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amount of time elapsed since the suit was filed." Maxfield v. 
Rushton, at 237 (quoting Westinqhouse Elec. Supply Co.. 544 P.2d at 
879). With regard to the issue of injustice, this Court held: 
[W]hile we recognize that injustice could result 
from dismissal of this case, in that Maxfield will lose 
whatever interest he may have in the disputed property 
without having the opportunity to argue his case on its 
merits, we conclude that he had more than ample 
opportunity to prove his asserted interest and simply 
failed to do so. Such nonaction is inexcusable, not only 
from the standpoint of the parties, but also because it 
constitutes abuse of the judicial process. 
Id. , at 240-241. It is apparent that the Court did not equate the 
activity in the case with timely prosecution. 
The special concurrence of Judge Orme is particularly 
pertinent to the case at hand. The concurring opinion identified 
the following conduct of the plaintiff as determinative: 
Maxfield's latest counsel's motion for leave to withdraw 
coupled with his motion for leave to file yet another 
amended complaint constituted, taken together, a 
concession by Maxfield that he was nowhere near being 
ready to try his case in the matter for a few days even 
though the action had been pending for the better part of 
a decade. It is the length of time this action had been 
pending, coupled with Maxfield's obvious unreadiness that 
makes sua sponte dismissal appropriate in this case. 
Id., at 241. 
In this case, Plaintiffs began a course of threats and 
harassment toward Defendants nearly five and one-half years prior 
to dismissal. Defendants received increasing demands for payment 
by Plaintiffs or by counsel on their behalf for nearly three years 
(in spite of Defendants' efforts to resolve the matter) before the 
original complaint was filed. The action was pending for two and 
one-half years, during which time Defendants prepared for trial. 
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Plaintiffs did not prepare for trial, but pressed Defendants with 
their demands for ever-increasing amounts of damages. Defendants 
are entitled to an end to threats by resolution of this matter. 
The courts are also entitled to relief. As in Maxfield v. 
Rushton, supra, Plaintiffs' nonaction is inexcusable, not only from 
Defendants' standpoint, but because it constitutes abuse of the 
judicial process. Dismissal, therefore, is consistent with the 
precedents of the Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. 
The Westinahouse factors remain the standard governing 
dismissal, whether the trial court dismisses, sua sponte, an action 
for failure to prosecute, pursuant to Rule 4-103, or upon motion, 
pursuant to Rule 41(b). Meadow Fresh Farms, at 1219. As 
Defendants have demonstrated above, an examination of the facts of 
this case in light of those factors supports dismissal of this 
action with prejudice and on the merits. It was within the trial 
court's discretion to grant Defendants' motion to dismiss, and 
affirmance of the dismissal is appropriate under the case law and 
just on the facts. 
POINT III 
NO CAUSES OF ACTION REMAIN FOR WHICH 
PLAINTIFFS CAN RECOVER EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES 
As stated by this Court in Maxfield v. Rushton, supra, because 
the dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint under Rule 41(b), U.R.Civ.P. 
was proper, it is dispositive of the entire case and the alleged 
error of the court relating to other matters is mdot. 
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Additionally, Plaintiffs' appeal is inadequate to address the 
issues which they now attempt to raise. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons hereinabove stated, the dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' complaint by the lower court should be affirmed. 
DATED this of January, 1994. 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber 
of NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellee Nielsen & Senior 
.chael L. Dowdl©/ Micha ] 
915 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Telephone: (801) 532-0060 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellee Pat B. Brian 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this /// day of January, 1994, I 
served the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE by causing a true and 
correct copy thereof to be mailed, United States mails, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Richard Coxson, Esq. 
275 North Main 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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Tab A 
Rule 41 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 100 
ner, there was no abuse in the district court's to cross-examination, the purely speculative 
denial of plaintiffs second motion. Hill v. need for a third witness did not entitle the de-
Dickerson. 839 P.2d 309 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). fendant to the granting of a motion for contin-
Need. uance. State v. Humpherys, 707 P.2d 109 
Where the defendant's counsel had three (Utah 1985). 
weeks to prepare for trial, and where two of the
 C i t e d i n T h o r , y T h o r l 5 7 g R M 9 2 ? 
witnesses, purportedly important to his case, 
were actually present at trial and thus subject (Utah 1978). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance ness in civil case, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272. 
§ 1 et seq.; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §§ 76, 80, 83, Continuance of civil case as conditioned 
84. upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses 
C.J.S. — 17 C.J.S. Continuances § 1 et seq.; incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144. 
88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 18 to 35. K e Y Numbers. — Continuance <s=> 1 et seq.; 
A.L.R. — Admissions to prevent contin- Trial «» 1 to 7. 
uance sought to secure testimony of absent wit-
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be dis-
missed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of 
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or 
of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismis-
sal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless other-
wise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is with-
out prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any 
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim. 
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this 
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs 
instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions 
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defen-
dant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the 
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the 
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the 
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this 
paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, 
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation 
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in 
the event the motion :s not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground 
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The 
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of 
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the 
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the 
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indis-
pensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The 
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, 
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to 
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and ] 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v.
 t 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah ] 
Corporation, Pat B. Brian, ] 
Defendants. 
| JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
| Civil No. 900400460CN 
i Judge VeNoy Christoffersen 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs• Complaint pursuant 
to Rule 41(b), U. R. Civ. P., came on for hearing before the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, March 
11, 1993. The hearing was conducted by telephone, pursuant to 
stipulation of counsel for the respective parties and as 
permitted by Rule 4-501(5), Code of Judicial Administration. The 
following appearances were entered: Richard C. Coxson for 
Plaintiffs; Arthur H. Nielsen, Larry L. Whyte and Marilynn P. 
Fineshriber of Nielsen & Senior for Defendant Nielsen & Senior; 
and Michael L. Dowdle for Defendant Pat B. Brian. Chris L. 
FILED !il 
4™ DISTRICT CCURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
In 6 9 35 &H 'S3 
Schmutz did not appear in person or by counsel, the action having 
previously been dismissed with prejudice as to him. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, motions, briefs 
and other records and papers in this matter, having heard the 
arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, 
made its oral ruling on the matter on March 11, 1993. The Court, 
having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, now 
HEREBY ENTERS JUDGMENT that Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs* Complaint pursuant to Rule 41(b), U. R. Civ. P. is 
hereby granted and Plaintiffs' complaint and said action be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety with prejudice and on the 
merits. 
Costs are awarded to Defendants. 
DATED this 3- day of ^Uh^Jy 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
wr 
Honorable VeNoy Chrirst(KfEersen 
0/ST 
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Arthur H. Nielsen (2405) 
Larry L. Whyte (4942) 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber (4571) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants Nielsen & Senior 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-1900 
Michael L. Dowdle 
Attorney for Defendant Pat B. Brian 
915 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Telephone (801) 531-0060 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and ] 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v. ; 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah ] 
Corporation, Pat B. Brian, ] 
Defendants. ] 
| FINDINGS OF FACT AND | CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. 900400460CN 
i Judge VeNoy Christoffersen 
Defendants• Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs• Complaint pursuant 
to Rule 41(b), U. R. Civ. P.f came on for hearing before the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, March 
11, 1993. The hearing was conducted by telephone, pursuant to 
stipulation of counsel for the respective parties and as 
permitted by Rule 4-501(5), Code of Judicial Administration. The 
following appearances were entered: Richard C. Coxson for 
Plaintiffs; Arthur H. Nielsen, Larry L. Whyte and Marilynn P. 
Fineshriber of Nielsen & Senior for Defendant Nielsen & Senior; 
and Michael L. Dowdle for Defendant Pat B. Brian. Chris L. 
FILED i:i 
4TH DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
\n?<\\ CO:;HTY 
ftp a 6 9 3S B f93 
Schmutz did not appear in person or by counsel, the action having 
previously been dismissed with prejudice as to him. 
Prior to argument of Defendants* Motion, Defendant Nielsen & 
Senior requested that all depositions in the case be published 
and be available for use by any of the parties and for the 
consideration of the Court. Defendant Nielsen & Senior, further, 
moved the Court to grant an Order that the matter should proceed 
in the true names of the Plaintiffs which was agreed to by 
Plaintiffs' counsel, at least for the present proceedings, and 
said motion was granted. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, motions, briefs 
and other records and papers in this matter, having heard the 
argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now 
makes and enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In January, 1986, Defendant Pat B. Brian 
(a) was a member of the firm of Nielsen & Senior; 
(b) was retained by Plaintiffs to represent them in 
the adoption of a child to be born in June, 1986; 
(c) met with the birth mother and obtained her 
preliminary commitment to place her child for 
adoption by the Plaintiffs. 
2. Following the birth of the child on June 25, 1986, in 
Texas, the child was returned to the State of Utah and placed in 
the custody of the Plaintiffs. 
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3. Since on or about June 27, 1986, when said child was 
delivered to Plaintiffs, it has never been out of the custody, 
care and control of the Plaintiffs. 
4. Defendant Brian claims to have discussed with the 
Plaintiffs the birth mother's reluctance to relinquish her child 
and the advisability of delaying the obtaining of her formal 
consent to adoption. Plaintiffs deny that this conversation took 
place. 
5. On or about December 19, 1986, the Petition for 
Adoption by Plaintiffs was filed by Defendant Nielsen & Senior. 
6. In approximately May, 1987, Defendant Brian was 
appointed a judge of the Third Judicial District Court of Utah. 
Defendant Nielsen & Senior continued to seek entry of a final 
Decree of Adoption. 
7. On or about June 23, 1987, Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
was informed by the birth mother that she would not give her 
consent to the adoption and wished to regain custody of the 
child. 
8. Plaintiffs were immediately informed of the birth 
mother's intention and they sought other counsel who, thereafter, 
represented them with regard to the adoption. 
9. Between July 1, 1987 and the middle of October, 1987, 
there was considerable activity, including Court appearances and, 
finally, negotiations which resulted in the birth mother being 
paid approximately $10,000.00 for alleged expenses she claimed to 
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have incurred, including attorney's fees, and the birth mother 
executed her formal consent to the adoption. 
10. On October 16, 1987, the Decree of Adoption was entered 
by the Court and the adoption was completed. 
11. In November, 1987, Plaintiffs, through their then 
counsel, Mark F. Robinson, contacted Defendants to assert claims 
for several thousand dollars allegedly incurred by Plaintiffs in 
finalizing the adoption at issue in this case. Shortly 
thereafter, Plaintiffs wrote a letter to Defendants Nielsen & 
Senior and Pat Brian demanding they be paid damages for the 
alleged improper handling of the adoption. 
12. In August, 1988, D. David Lambert of the law firm of 
Howard, Lewis and Petersen in Provo, made contact with Defendants 
to assert Plaintiffs* claims regarding the adoption. At this 
time, Plaintiffs were demanding payment of $47,000.00. 
Defendants met with Mr. Lambert to discuss the possible 
resolution of Plaintiffs' claims. On February 17, 1989, Mr. 
Lambert's representation of Plaintiffs was terminated by 
Plaintiffs. 
13. Thereafter, direct contact was had with Plaintiffs by 
Defendants and negotiations were conducted during which 
Plaintiffs' demands increased and attempts were made by 
Plaintiffs to involve LDS Church officials and the news media. 
During this period, Plaintiffs also alternated in claiming that 
they were representing themselves or that they had retained 
counsel. 
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14. Finally, on June 22, 1990, Plaintiffs filed their 
original complaint, pro se. The complaint contained claims 
against one or more Defendants for breach of contract, 
negligence, violation of child placement laws, breach of 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation, 
intentional infliction and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. Plaintiffs sought damages of an undisclosed amount. 
15. On or about July 2, 1990, Plaintiffs filed their first 
Amended Complaint, which generally contained the same claims for 
relief. 
16. During the spring and summer of 1990, Plaintiffs 
claimed to be searching for legal counsel to represent them 
against Defendants. Plaintiffs publicized the matter by 
contacting scores of lawyers and law firms, sending out packets 
of information which contained, among other things, their claims 
against Defendant Brian then pending before the Utah State Bar. 
17. One of the attorneys contacted by Plaintiffs was D. 
Lanny Waite, a Las Vegas, Nevada, attorney who claimed to 
represent Plaintiffs in this matter. On or about July 13, 1990, 
he wrote Defendants a letter demanding payment of $180,000.00, 
and expressed his anticipation that the media attention already 
given to the case would increase due to Judge Brian's position. 
Defendants responded, rejecting the claim and Plaintiffs later 
stated that Mr. Waite was not going to represent them. 
18. Defendants answered the First Amended Complaint and on 
or about July 30, 1990, Defendant Nielsen & Senior noticed the 
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Plaintiffs1 depositions, to commence on August 17, 1990. On 
August 16, 1990, the day before the scheduled depositions, Jerold 
D. Conder and Peter L. Rognlie of the law firm of Conder & 
Wangsgard entered their appearance as counsel for Plaintiffs, and 
requested that the depositions be postponed until counsel could 
become familiar with the case. 
19. On or about September 12, 1990, Conder & Wangsgard 
filed Plaintiffs* Second Amended Complaint, alleging professional 
malpractice, breach of contract, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (as to Defendant Brian only), negligent 
infliction of emotional distress and negligent misrepresentation. 
20. The deposition of Plaintiff James Johnson finally began 
on November 28, 1990, more than three months after it was 
originally scheduled. The deposition lasted for three (3) days, 
(with frequent interruptions) at which time disagreement 
developed between Plaintiffs and their counsel involving the 
testimony of Plaintiff. The deposition was adjourned by 
Plaintiffs' counsel, indicating that Mr. Johnson was ill. 
21. On or about January 16, 1991, Conder & Wangsgard 
withdrew as counsel for Plaintiffs, and Defendant Nielsen & 
Senior sent out a notice to appoint counsel or to appear in 
person on January 18, 1991. 
22. On March 21, 1991, David R. Irvine wrote to Defendant 
Nielsen & Senior, indicating that he had been contacted by and 
anticipated entering his appearance as counsel of record for 
Plaintiffs, and inquiring regarding a resolution of this matter 
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by settlement. Notwithstanding the letter and preliminary 
discussions, Mr. Irvine did not enter an appearance for 
Plaintiffs as counsel in the case. 
23. A scheduling conference was scheduled by the Court for 
April 16, 1991. The conference was continued at the instance of 
Darwin C. Fisher of Nielsen, Hill & Fisher, who entered an 
appearance on behalf of Plaintiffs on April 15, 1991. 
24. A new scheduling and settlement conference was 
scheduled by the Court for June 26, 1991, in Logan, Utah. This 
conference was held, however, on July 12, 1991. At that time 
Plaintiffs' counsel refused to engage in any meaningful 
discussion as to resolution of the case due to his need to 
familiarize himself with the case. 
25. Following the conference on July 12, 1991, a scheduling 
order was entered by this Court on August 13, 1991, setting 
discovery and motion cutoff, expert witness designation and 
pretrial conference dates, and a trial date of February 3-10, 
1992. The Order also required that a Pre-trial Order be 
submitted on or before January 13, 1992. Defendants* repeated 
efforts to obtain the stipulation of Plaintiffs' counsel to a 
proposed Pre-Trial Order were unsuccessful. Plaintiffs never 
submitted a proposed Pre-trial Order to the Court. 
26. Notwithstanding Defendants1 numerous attempts to 
complete Plaintiffs1 depositions, continuation of the deposition 
of Plaintiff James Johnson was delayed until October 10, 1991 
because Plaintiff refused to appear. The reasons given for the 
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delay were that Mr. Fisher was still insufficiently familiar with 
facts of the case. The deposition examination was finally 
concluded on October 11, 1991, almost a year after it was begun. 
27. A hearing was held in St. George, Utah on December 6, 
1991, regarding Defendants' motions to dismiss, or in the 
alternative for summary judgment as to some of the causes of 
action in Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint. At the hearing, 
also, the parties discussed resolution of the case. Mr. Fisher 
requested delay of the trial set for February 3-10, 1992, until 
later that month which was granted and the trial set for February 
18, 1992. Various scheduling dates were again set. 
28. Pursuant to this Court's Order of January, 1992, 
Defendant Pat B. Brian was granted leave to file a Counterclaim. 
Upon motion of Plaintiffs1 counsel, the trial setting for 
February 18-28, 1992, was stricken and the trial set for May 5 
through 14, 1992. 
29. In February, 1992, this Court heard Defendants' motions 
to dispose of certain causes of action in Plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint and granted the same, narrowing the causes of 
action in the case to professional negligence and breach of 
contract. 
30. Subsequent to this hearing, in April, 1992, counsel for 
Plaintiffs entreated the Court to strike the trial date set for 
May on the basis that discovery was still necessary to complete 
preparations for trial, that counsel could not be ready for the 
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trial in so short a time, and that certain conflicts existed 
which necessitated that the date be re-set. 
31. Although opposed by Defendants, the motion to strike 
the trial date was granted by the Court. A new trial date was 
set for November 2-13, 1992, and the discovery cut-off date was 
extended to May 1, 1992. 
32. In April, 1992, counsel for Plaintiffs filed with the 
Utah Supreme Court a petition for permission to appeal from the 
interlocutory order of the trial Court dismissing certain causes 
of action in Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint. 
33. On April 7, 1992, this Court entered an order striking 
the scheduling order, and continuing the trial, without date. 
34. The Utah Supreme Court denied the Plaintiffs1 petition 
for interlocutory appeal on May 21, 1992. 
35. During discovery proceedings, Plaintiff gave notice of 
taking the deposition of Lizanne Magleby. On the date scheduled, 
Ms. Magleby did not appear. Counsel for all parties agreed that 
Plaintiffs could reschedule the deposition. Thereafter, 
Plaintiffs* counsel met privately with Ms. Magleby, and then 
cancelled Ms. Magleby*s deposition altogether. 
36. Thereafter, Defendants noticed the taking of the 
deposition of Ms. Magleby, whereupon Plaintiffs refused to 
cooperate in the taking of Ms. Magleby*s deposition. Defendants 
were required to obtain leave of the Court to depose Ms. Magleby 
after the discovery cut-off, notwithstanding that it was 
Plaintiff's dilatory conduct in scheduling, and then cancelling, 
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the deposition which delayed the taking of the deposition by 
Defendants. 
37. The deposition was set for June 30, 1992. Plaintiffs 
moved, again, to delay on the grounds that their counsel would be 
unable to attend. The matter was argued to the court on June 25, 
1992, and an Order entered that the deposition proceed as 
scheduled. 
38. Plaintiffs moved to extend the discovery cut-off date 
set by the Court for May 1, 1992. The Court denied Plaintiffs1 
request and stated in its Memorandum Decision dated May 20, 1992, 
that no exception would be permitted. 
39. Plaintiffs have taken no action to move this case 
forward since Plaintiffs took the deposition of Brent Hoggan in 
May, 1992, approximately ten months ago. 
40. The deposition of Ms. Magleby, by Defendants, was the 
last action on the case. 
41. On or about October 5, 1992, Darwin C. Fisher moved for 
leave to withdraw as Plaintiff's counsel. Defendant Brian 
opposed the Motion, arguing that further delay would be 
prejudicial to Defendants. Nevertheless, Richard C. Coxson 
entered an appearance on behalf of Plaintiffs on October 26, 
1992. Due to the appearance of Mr. Coxson, Mr. Fisher's Motion 
was granted and the appearance of Mr. Coxson as counsel for 
Plaintiffs was acknowledged by the Court on November 19, 1992. 
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42. Following the entry of his appearance in October, 1992, 
Plaintiffs * counsel failed to take any action to move the case 
toward trial until after Defendants moved for dismissal. 
43. The course of conduct of Plaintiffs since this dispute 
arose has been directed toward proliferating the issues and to 
avoid trial before the Court. 
44. The conduct of the Defendants has been directed toward 
narrowing the issues and preparing the case for trial. 
Defendants have not delayed or hindered the prosecution of this 
case. 
45. Plaintiffs have failed to abide by the Court's orders 
to move the case forward, most recently violating the Court's 
Order for discovery cut-off, which Order of May 20, 1992, 
specifically refused to extend discovery further. Following 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failing to prosecute the case, 
Plaintiffs on February 17, 1993 submitted a set of forty Requests 
for Admission which were duplicative and evidenced a total lack 
of familiarity with the issues in the case. 
46. During the nearly three years this case has been 
pending, the Plaintiffs have violated the Court's Orders setting 
the date by which discovery must be completed, repeatedly made 
changes of counsel requiring the Court to educate counsel 
regarding the facts and posture of the case, and, most recently, 
have alluded to further amendment and broadening of the claims as 
originally set forth by Plaintiffs' complaint. 
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47. Plaintiffs are now represented by their seventh 
attorney and Plaintiffs' failure to maintain counsel has resulted 
in prejudice to the Defendants. 
48. The issue remaining to be litigated in this matter is 
the claimed negligence and/or breach of contract by Defendants in 
connection with Plaintiffs' adoption of the minor child. 
49. Any damages suffered by Plaintiffs, which Defendants 
dispute, would have been incurred during the three and one-half 
months approximately from July 1, 1987 to October 15, 1987 when 
the dispute over the adoption was settled. 
50. There is a dispute of facts as to whether those fees 
and costs were necessarily incurred or whether Nielsen & Senior 
could have finalized the adoption without the necessity of the 
intervention of other counsel. 
Having made its Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Rule 41(b), U. R. Civ. P., empowers this Court to 
dismiss an action, with prejudice and on the merits, for failure 
of the Plaintiffs to prosecute. 
2. Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within 
the broad discretion of the trial court. 
3. The single issue presently before the Court is whether 
the Motion to Dismiss is sufficiently supported by the facts of 
the case and any allegations of the Plaintiffs regarding contacts 
with or by ecclesiastical authorities or with state and federal 
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agencies are not relevant to Defendants1 Motion and will not be 
considered by the Court. 
4. The factors to be considered in determining whether 
dismissal for failure to prosecute is appropriate are set forth 
in Westinqhouse Electrical Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen 
Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) and restated by the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
5. The Court has considered those factors in determining 
whether to grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, as follows: 
a. With respect to Factor (1), the Lapse of Time, the 
Court concludes that a considerable lapse of time has occurred in 
this case, almost five and one-half (5 1/2) years since the 
claims were first made by Plaintiffs against Defendants, and over 
two and one-half (2 1/2) years since the filing of the original 
complaint. While this is not the deciding factor in the Court's 
analysis, it is of significance to the Court• 
b. With respect to Factor (2), the Conduct of the Parties, 
the Court concludes that Defendants have consistently and 
continuously moved the case forward through conducting discovery, 
narrowing of the scope of the case through pre-trial motions, and 
cooperating with the Court and opposing counsel in adherence to 
Court cut-off dates and deadlines. In contrast, Plaintiffs have 
persisted in delaying and prolonging the prosecution of the case 
through the regular replacement of counsel, requiring re-
education of new counsel in each instance, and through continual 
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and persistent attempts to extend cut-off dates and deadlines, to 
expand the scope of discovery and to introduce new issues into 
the case. Weighing the conduct of the parties, the Court 
concludes that this factor weighs heavily in favor of Defendants. 
c. With respect to Factors (3) and (4), the Opportunity to 
Move the Case Forward and the Actions of the Parties to Do So, 
the Court concludes that all parties in this case have had equal 
opportunity to move the case forward to trial. For the same 
reasons as stated in subparagraph (b) above, the Court concludes 
that Defendants have taken advantage of their opportunity to move 
the case forward in every instance. In contrast, and in the face 
of their primary burden to do so, Plaintiffs have failed to move 
the case forward to trial, and have, rather, obstructed 
Defendants1 and the Court's efforts to do so in virtually every 
instance. Weighing the opportunity to move the case forward and 
the actions of the parties in doing so, the Court concludes that 
this factor weighs heavily in favor of Defendants. 
d. With respect to Factor (5), the Difficulty and 
Prejudice of the Parties, the Court concludes that both sides of 
this case have been prejudiced by the failure to move this case 
toward trial. The Court has concluded, however, that the fault 
for the difficulty and prejudice suffered by the parties is 
Plaintiffs1 in every instance. Plaintiffs1 actions in the 
constant replacement of counsel, and attempts to delay and 
broaden the scope of discovery and issues in the case are 
entirely to blame for the difficulty and prejudice suffered by 
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the parties. Weighing the difficulty and prejudice to the 
parties, and to the Court, the Court concludes that this factor 
weighs heavily in favor of Defendants. 
e. With respect to Factor (6), the Injustice Which May 
Result from Dismissal, the Court concludes that no injustice will 
result to the Plaintiffs in this case. The issue remaining to be 
litigated in this matter is the claimed negligence and/or breach 
of contract by Defendants in connection with adoption by 
Plaintiffs of the minor child. The child has never been out of 
Plaintiffs' custody, and the adoption was finalized within three 
and one-half (3 1/2) months of the making of the original claim 
by the natural mother to obtain custody. The Court concludes 
that only minor monetary costs could have been incurred by 
Plaintiffs with new counsel to finalize the adoption. Even these 
amounts are disputed by Defendants as having been unnecessarily 
incurred, since Nielsen & Senior could have completed the 
adoption. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs1 conduct in this 
case has been the cause of the delay, difficulty and prejudice 
suffered in this case, and that no injustice will result from the 
dismissal of Plaintiffs* claims with prejudice. 
6. Plaintiffs* conduct constitutes abuse of the judicial 
process as set forth in Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
7. Dismissal of Plaintiffs * case with prejudice and on the 
merits is justified by Plaintiffs * dilatory conduct as set forth 
in Hill v. Dickersonf 839 P.2d 309 (Utah App. 1992). 
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8. Following dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the 
Counterclaim of Defendant Brian should be dismissed also. 
9. All other outstanding motions before the Court, 
specifically, Plaintiffs' Request for Admissions, Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Defendants' 
Objections to Requests for Admissions, and Defendants' Motion for 
Sanctions are, likewise, rendered moot. 
10. Defendants are entitled to their costs herein incurred. 
DATED this £ —day of itoeh, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
7/y 
'CjL 
-t7-V e N o y / C h r i s t o f fers^ej}7 
/7 " 
Richard C. Coxson 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Jl^tiay of March, 1993, I 
have served Defendants' proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment by causing a true and correct copy of the 
same to be sent, through the United States mails, first-class 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Richard C. Coxson, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
275 North Main 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
^W(n^^ /?nt44^ytA^ 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
332 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
May 21, 1992 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Michael L. Dowdle 
ALLEN, NELSON, HARDY & EVANS 
Attorneys at Law 
215 South State, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
James A. Johnson and, 
Jennifer L. Johnson, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. No. 920170 
Nielsen & Senior, a Utah 900400460CN 
Corporation and Pat B. Brian, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
THIS DAY, Petition for an interlocutory appeal having been 
heretofore considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in 
the premises, it is ordered that an interlocutory appeal be, and the 
same is, denied. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
TabE 
Arthur H. Nielsen (2405) 
Marilyn P. Fineshriber (4571) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants Nielsen & Senior 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
„T HIED IK 
4 " DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH -A ' ^'TV 
Hw 3 12 07 PH '33 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
professional corporation, and 
PAT B. BRIAN, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY L. WHYTE 
Civil No. 900400460CN 
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
LARRY L. WHYTE, being first duly sworn and upon oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of 
Utah; am over the age of 18 years; and am competent to testify to 
the matters contained herein. 
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2. At all relevant times herein, I was one of the attorneys 
who represented Defendant Nielsen & Senior in the above-referenced 
action. 
3. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein, 
and if called, would competently testify as to the same. 
4. I have reviewed the Affidavit of Darwin C. Fisher, and 
find the same to be factually incorrect, containing many false 
statements and misrepresentations. As a result, I hereby respond 
to each and every paragraph of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit. 
5. In response to paragraph 3 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit, 
Affiant denies that Mall continuances of Mr. Johnson's deposition 
was [sic] at the request of Nielsen & Senior and Judge Brian." 
Affiant sets forth the following information and history relating 
to Defendants' numerous attempts to depose Plaintiffs: 
a. On July 30, 1992, Defendant Nielsen & Senior noticed 
Plaintiffs' depositions for August 17, 1990. [See Record.] 
b* On or about August 3, 1990, Plaintiffs objected to 
their scheduled depositions and requested a continuance until 
September 28, 1990, by filing an Ex Parte Motion for Enlargement of 
Time and Order No. 2. [See Record.] 
c. On August 16, 1990, the day before the scheduled 
depositions, Jerold D. Conder and Peter L. Rognlie of the law firm 
of Conder & Wangsgard, entered their appearance as counsel for 
Plaintiff's [see Record], and requested that the depositions be 
postponed until counsel could become familiar with the case. 
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d. On September 19, 1990, Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
again noticed Plaintiffs* depositions for November 6, 1990. [See 
Record.] 
e. On October 26, 1990, Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
rescheduled Plaintiffs' depositions to November 28, 1990, at the 
request of Plaintiffs' counsel, because of "scheduling conflicts." 
[See Record.] 
f. The deposition of Plaintiff James Johnson finally 
began on November 28, 1990, more than three months after it was 
originally scheduled. The deposition lasted for three (3) days, 
with frequent interruptions. By the afternoon of the third day, a 
disagreement developed between Plaintiffs and their counsel 
involving the testimony of Plaintiff. The deposition was 
unilaterally adjourned by Plaintiffs' counsel, indicating that 
Mr. Johnson was ill. [See Deposition Transcript.] 
g. Thereafter, Defendant Nielsen & Senior attempted to 
obtain new dates from Plaintiffs' counsel for resuming Plaintiff 
James Johnson's deposition, without success. 
h. On December 11, 1990, Plaintiffs' counsel sent a 
letter to Defendant Nielsen & Senior informing it that Plaintiff 
James Johnson would be unavailable for the completion of his 
deposition until sometime after January 1991. The letter from 
Plaintiffs ' counsel was accompanied by a letter from a psychologist 
who claimed that Plaintiff James Johnson's depression, stress and 
anxiety prevented him from appearing for his deposition any 
earlier. (A copy of the December 11, 1990, letter, accompanied by 
-3-
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the December 7, 1990, letter from Ralph W. Gant, are attached 
hereto as Exhibit 1.) 
i. On January 9, 1991, Plaintiffs' counsel filed a 
motion to extend (for an indefinite period) the time in which 
Plaintiff James Johnson was to examine and correct the partial 
deposition (which had been transcribed), again alleging that this 
extension of time was necessary due to the stress and depression 
which Plaintiff James Johnson was allegedly suffering from. [See 
Record•] 
j. On February 21, 1991, Defendant Nielsen & Senior, 
because of the difficulties it had already experience in scheduling 
and completing the deposition of Plaintiff James Johnson, filed a 
motion for a scheduling and discovery conference. [See Record.] 
k. On February 21, 1991, Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
also noticed the continuation of Plaintiff James Johnson's 
deposition for March 5, 1991. [See Record.] 
1« Late in the afternoon on March 4, 1991, Plaintiff 
James Johnson presented himself at the office of Defendant Nielsen 
& Senior, and in a meeting with Affiant, informed Affiant that he 
was leaving on vacation with his wife and children to Las Vegas, 
Nevada, and would not be present for his deposition the following 
morning, March 5, 1991. Plaintiffs did not appear for their 
scheduled depositions on March 5, 1991. 
m. Thereafter, attorney David R. Irvine, on behalf of 
Plaintiffs, contacted Defendant Nielsen & Senior and reached an 
agreement with Arthur Nielsen, wherein Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
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would refrain from taking any further action in this matter for a 
short period of time, pending finalization of Mr. Irvine's 
agreement for representation of Plaintiffs. This agreement was 
confirmed in a letter from Affiant to Michael L. Dowdle dated 
March 12, 1991. (A copy of the letter is attached hereto as 
Exhibit 2.) 
n. Thereafter/ Defendant Nielsen & Senior received no 
communication or word from David R. Irvine and therefore, on 
March 20/ 1991# Defendant Nielsen & Senior again re-noticed the 
continuation of Plaintiff James Johnson's deposition for March 28, 
1991/ providing a complimentary copy to David R. Irvinef along with 
a cover letter. (A copy of the March 20f 199lf letter is attached 
hereto as Exhibit 3.) 
o. On March 21/ 1991/ Plaintiff James Johnson's 
psychologist/ Ralph W. Gant# wrote a letter to the Honorable VeNoy 
Christoffersen/ stating/ in substancef that Plaintiff Johnson's 
condition (stress and depression) prevented him from continuing 
with his deposition on March 28/ 1991/ and requested that 
Mr. Johnson's deposition be postponed. (A copy of the March 21, 
1991/ letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.) 
p. On March 26, 1991, Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
received a letter from Plaintiffs requesting that Plaintiffs' 
depositions scheduled for March 28 , 1991/ be continued without 
date. (A copy of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 5.) 
q. Plaintiffs did not appear for their scheduled 
depositions on March 28/ 1991. 
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r. On April 4, 1991, the Court sent out notice of a 
scheduling conference for April 16, 1991. [See Record.] 
s. On April 9, 1991, Plaintiffs filed a notice of 
objection to the scheduling conference scheduled for April 16, 
1991. [See Record.] 
t. The scheduling conference was continued at the 
request of Darwin C. Fisher, who entered an appearance on behalf of 
Plaintiffs on April 15, 1991. 
u. On April 17, 1991, the Court sent another notice of 
a settlement conference for June 26, 1991. [See Record.] 
v. On June 20, 1991, Defendant Nielsen & Senior again 
noticed the continuation of Plaintiff James Johnson's deposition 
for July 8, 1991. [See Record.] 
w. Shortly thereafter, Darwin C. Fisher contacted 
Affiant and indicated that he would be unable to attend the 
scheduling conference on June 26, 1991, in Logan, Utah, and 
requested that the date again be rescheduled, causing yet another 
delay. 
x. The settlement conference was continued from 
June 26, 1991, to July 8, 1991. However, on July 5, 1991, 
Darwin C. Fisher contacted Affiant and indicated that Plaintiff 
James Johnson would be unable to attend his deposition scheduled 
for July 8, 1991, and requested that it be postponed. Mr. Fisher 
also stated that his client's deposition should not be taken prior 
to the scheduling conference scheduled for July 12, 1991. (See 
*Q300.N1211.8500 
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copy of Affiant's letter confirming said action, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit 6•) 
y. On August 21, 1991, Affiant wrote a letter to 
Darwin C. Fisher, informing Mr. Fisher, among other things, that 
Plaintiff James Johnson had unilaterally terminated his deposition 
the prior November, stating that Defendants were anxious to 
complete Mr. Johnson's deposition, and requesting confirmation that 
Mr. Johnson was sufficiently well to continue with his deposition. 
(A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 7.) 
z. On September 5, 1991, Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
Dnce again noticed the continuation of the deposition of Plaintiff 
James Johnson for October 7, 1991. [See Record.] 
aa. Notwithstanding Defendants' numerous attempts to 
:omplete Plaintiffs* depositions, continuation of the deposition of 
Plaintiff James Johnson was delayed because Plaintiffs refused to 
ippear until October 10, 1991. Mr. Johnson's deposition 
examination was finally concluded on October 11, 1991, almost one 
'ear after it was begun. 
ab. All of the delays occasioned with the taking and 
ompletion of Plaintiff James Johnson's deposition are documented 
nd, without exception, were caused because of Plaintiff's failure 
nd refusal to appear. None of the delays in the taking and 
ompletion of Plaintiffs' depositions were attributable to any of 
he Defendants. 
6« In response to paragraph 4 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit, 
ffiant denies that Defendants "requested continuances for the 
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taking of Mr, Johnson's Deposition, M for the reasons set forth in 
paragraph 6 above. Without exception, notices of Plaintiffs1 
depositions and the continuation of Plaintiff James Johnson's 
deposition were sent out each time the depositions were scheduled 
in an attempt to compel the appearance of Plaintiffs and to 
document Defendants' efforts to depose Plaintiffs. 
Affiant further denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph 4 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit, that after Mr. Fisher began 
his representation of Plaintiffs that Defendants requested that 
they be allowed to complete the taking of the Plaintiffs' 
depositions before Plaintiffs could depose the Defendants. At the 
inception of this case, it was agreed between all parties, and 
subsequently by Plaintiffs' counsel, that Defendants would be 
allowed to completely depose Plaintiffs before Plaintiffs would be 
allowed to depose Defendants. This agreement was confirmed in a 
letter from Plaintiffs' counsel dated December 11, 1990. (A copy 
of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 8.) Upon Mr. Fisher's 
appearance in this matter, Mr. Fisher was informed of this 
agreement regarding the order in which depositions would be taken 
and stipulated and agreed to the same. 
7. In response to paragraph 5 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit, 
Affiant denies that Defendant Pat Brian requested a continuance of 
the commencement of his deposition until December 1991. Defendant 
Pat Brian's deposition was taken on November 30, 1991, and 
completed on December 14, 1991. The court reporter submitted the 
2P5Q0.NI211.8500 
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deposition transcripts on December 2, 1991, and December 14, 1991, 
respectively. [See Deposition Transcripts•] 
8. In response to paragraph 6 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit, 
Affiant denies Defendants delayed the taking of the Deposition of 
Mr. Johnson, for the reasons set forth in paragraph 6 above. 
Affiant further denies that there was any delay in the taking of 
Defendants' depositions based on the need to depose Mrs. Johnson. 
Affiant also denies that Defendants "delayed the taking 
3f the Depositions of the Defendants until the latter part of 
December 1991.H The depositions of Chris L. Schmutz and Defendant 
Pat Brian were taken in November and December of 1991, following 
h^e completion of Plaintiff James Johnson's deposition. The only 
iepositions to which Defendant Nielsen & Senior objected were those 
>£ its attorneys, who were neither parties nor witnesses. Affiant 
sets forth the following information and history concerning the 
tefendants1 depositions and the Motion for Protective Order: 
a. Plaintiffs* Second Amended Complaint alleged, among 
rther things, malpractice against Pat B. Brian and Chris L. 
chmutz, who were attorneys employed by Nielsen & Senior. By 
irtue of their employment, Plaintiffs also made claims against 
efendant Nielsen & Senior. [See Record.] 
b« On August 16, 1991, Mr. Fisher, via letter, notified 
ffiant of his intent to take the depositions of Arthur H. Nielsen, 
ary A. Weston, Richard M. Hymas and Larry L. Whyte. (A copy of 
he letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 9.) 
500.NI211.8500 
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c. While these four individuals were all attorneys 
employed by Nielsen & Senior, neither Mr. Nielsen, nor Mr. Whyte, 
were referenced in Plaintiffs1 pleadings. [See Record.] In fact, 
Mr. Nielsen had been out of the country during much of 1986 and 
1987, and Mr Whyte was not employed by Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
during 1986 or 1987, the relevant time period referenced in 
Plaintiffs' complaint. [See Deposition Transcripts.] 
d. Mr. Nielsen and Mr. Whyte represented Defendant 
Nielsen & Senior in the action filed by Plaintiffs. [See Record.] 
e. On August 27, 1991, Affiant, via letter, responded 
to Mr. Fisher's August 16, 1991 letter, advising Mr. Fisher that 
Affiant was not aware of any rule authorizing the taking of the 
depositions of opposing counsel and that if Mr. Fisher intended to 
pursue the taking of these depositions, a motion for protective 
order would be filed. (A copy of the letter is attached hereto as 
Exhibit 10.) 
f. On September 3, 1991, Mr. Fisher sent a letter to 
Affiant, accompanied by notices of deposition for Arthur H. 
Nielsen, Gary A. Weston, Richard M. Hymas and Larry L. Whyte. The 
last paragraph of his letter states, HI am sending to you the 
Notices of Depositions so you may apply for a protective order." 
(A copy of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 11.) 
g. Shortly after receipt of the notices of depositions, 
Defendant Nielsen & Senior served a Motion for Protective Order 
accompanied by a memorandum, and the issue was briefed by all 
parties. [See Record.] 
-10-
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h. A hearing was held in St. George, Utah, on 
December 6, 1991. Among other issues addressed was Defendant 
Nielsen & Senior's Motion for Protective Order. Upon the 
completion of oral argument, Judge Christoffersen denied 
Defendant's Motion for Protective Order. [See Transcript of 
Hearing.] 
i. The depositions of Messrs. Nielsen, Weston, Hymas & 
Whyte were taken on December 13, 1991 (in addition to the 
deposition of Christ L. Schmutz, to which neither of the Defendants 
Nielsen & Senior nor Pat B. Brian objected), and not the "latter 
part of December, 1991* as asserted by Mr. Fisher. The depositions 
lasted less than half a day and, combined, totaled less than 160 
pages. The court reporter submitted the transcripts of these four 
depositions on December 26, 1991. [See Deposition Transcripts.] 
9# In response to paragraph 7 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit, 
Affiant denies that M[a]t a hearing in December 1991, Defendant Pat 
Brian first stated that he intended to file a Counterclaim." At 
the scheduling conference held before Judge Christoffersen on 
July 12, 1991, in Logan, Utah, Michael L. Dowdle, counsel for 
Defendant Pat B. Brian gave notice of his intention to file a 
counterclaim on behalf of his client against Plaintiffs. 
Mr. Fisher was in attendance at this scheduling conference. 
Or. Dowdle further explained the factual basis of Defendant Pat 
Brians counterclaim against Plaintiffs. Mr. Dowdle stated that he 
leeded to discover additional information, which he anticipated 
*ould be forthcoming in Mr. Johnson's deposition, and that because 
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of the restrictions of Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P., he would be unable to 
file a counterclaim until after Plaintiff James Johnson's 
deposition was completed. [See Hearing Transcript.] Defendant 
Brian's Motion for Leave to File a Counterclaim was filed promptly 
after the completion of the deposition of Plaintiff James Johnson. 
[See Record.] Affiant states that it was through the deposition of 
Plaintiff James Johnson that Defendant Pat Brian became aware of 
many facts supporting the claims contained in Mr. Brian's 
counterclaim. 
At the December 6, 1991# hearing, Judge Christoffersen 
granted Defendant Pat Brian's Motion for Leave to File a 
Counterclaim. At that time, upon the insistence of Mr. Fisher, the 
trial which had been set for February 3 through 10, 1992, was 
continued to February 18 through 28, 1992. [See Hearing 
Transcript*] Upon the signing of the Court's Order granting 
Defendant Pat Brian's Motion for Leave to File a Counterclaim in 
January 1992, Mr* Fisher moved to continue the trial. The February 
18 through 28 trial setting was stricken and trial was rescheduled 
for May 5 through 14, 1992. [See Record.] In response to 
paragraph 8 of Mr* Fisher's Affidavit, Affiant denies that 
Mr. Fisher filed an Interlocutory Appeal in approximately January 
1991* On April 3, 1992, Plaintiffs filed with the Utah Supreme 
Court a Petition for Permission to File Interlocutory Appeal from 
this Court's Order granting Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. [See Record•] 
20300. N1211.8500 
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10. In response to paragraph 9 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit, 
Affiant states that Plaintiffs' Petition for Permission to File 
Interlocutory Appeal was denied on May 21, 1992. In June 1992, a 
court hearing was held, via telephone, in which counsel for all 
parties participated. During said hearing, the trial was set and 
scheduled for November 2 through 23, 1992. Judge Christoffersen 
instructed that this new trial be inserted in the Pre-Trial Order 
and that the Pre-Trial Order be filed. 
11. It was the obligation of Plaintiffs, by and through their 
attorney, Darwin C. Fisher, to prepare the Pre-trial Order, which 
they failed to do. Originally, the Pre-trial Order was due in 
January 1992. Defendants prepared and submitted to Plaintiffs' 
counsel several drafts of a proposed Pre-trial Order. However, 
Mr. Fisher refused to agree to any of the proposed Pre-trial Orders 
and was uncooperative in assisting Affiant in preparing a joint 
Pre-trial Order. Further, Mr. Fisher failed in his duty to prepare 
and file a Pre-trial Order with the Court. It has been Affiant*s 
understanding since June 1992 that the trial was set for November 2 
through 13, despite Mr. Fisher's failure to prepare or file a Pre-
Trial Order. At the time Mr. Fisher filed his Notice of 
Withdrawal, Affiant was preparing for trial. 
12. In response to paragraph 10 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit, 
Affiant denies the same in its entirety, including the allegations 
that Defendants "were uncooperative in Discovery," "made no 
attempts to move this case along," and "deliberately postponed the 
:aking of the Depositions of the Defendants until the Discovery 
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period had almost elapsed,M for the reasons set forth in paragraphs 
6 and 9 above. 
13. In response to paragraph 11 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit, 
Affiant denies that Mr. Fisher "did not object to the taking of the 
Deposition of the natural mother." Despite his representations to 
the contrary, Mr. Fisher did object to the taking of the natural 
mother's deposition by Defendant Nielsen & Senior, requiring 
Defendant Nielsen & Senior to argue the matter to the Court, via a 
telephone hearing, in order to obtain permission to proceed with 
the deposition on June 30, 1992. 
Plaintiffs1 initially noticed the deposition of the 
natural mother for April 9, 1992. [See Record.] On the date of 
the deposition, counsel for all parties appeared at the time and 
placed scheduled. However, the natural mother failed to appear. 
Prior to Affiant returning to his office, the natural mother spoke 
with Mr. Fisher on the telephone, indicating her inability to 
attend the deposition that day. Mr. Fisher assured Affiant that he 
would reschedule the deposition as soon as possible. Not until May 
1992, nearly six weeks later, did Mr. Fisher notify Affiant that, 
after speaking with the natural mother, he had decided not to 
reschedule her deposition, at which time Affiant notified 
Mr. Fisher that Nielsen & Senior would like to take her deposition 
before May 20, 1992. (See Exhibit 12.) Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
immediately noticed the natural mother's deposition for the 
earliest possible date. By letter dated June 4, 1992, Affiant 
notified Mr. Fisher of Defendant Nielsen & Senior's desire to 
-14-
20300.NI211.8500 
depose the natural mother as soon as possible and stated if no 
response was received by June 16, 1992, Affiant would proceed to 
schedule her deposition and have subpoena served, which he did. (A 
copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 13 •) Not until 
June 19, 1992, after the subpoena had been served, did Mr* Fisher 
respond by letter dated June 19, 1992, suggesting deposition dates 
yet another four to six weeks away, (A copy of the letter is 
attached hereto as Exhibit 14.) By letter dated June 24, 1992, 
Affiant responded to Mr. Fisher, saying that the Court had directed 
that the deposition of the natural mother proceed as noticed. (A 
copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 15.) 
14. In response to paragraph 12 of Mr. Fishers Affidavit, 
Affiant denies he or any of the other attorneys for Defendants 
argued to the Court "that they could not get a date that was 
available to Nielsen & Senior and to Judge Brian (to take the 
deposition of the natural mother) prior to the [sic] November 1992 
which was the date all parties believed to be the trial date," for 
the reasons set forth in paragraph 14, above. Defendant Nielsen & 
Senior was desirous of taking the deposition of the natural mother 
as soon as possible. Mr. Fisher ultimately objected to the date 
selected for the deposition. He argued to the Court that he was 
involved in other matters, which he could not change, and as a 
result thereof he was unable to attend the natural mother's 
deposition on June 30, 1992, and requested it be rescheduled at a 
later date. However, Mr. Fisher failed to inform the Court that 
the other matters which he could not change were depositions which 
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he (Mr, Fisher) had noticed in another case in which he was 
representing Plaintiffs, entitled Steven Davis and Kristi Davis v. 
H«B. Layne Contractors, Inc., filed in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, as Civil No. 
91-C-769G. Furthermore, in requiring that the deposition proceed 
as noticed, the Court allowed Mr. Davis to cross-exam the natural 
mother at a later date if he so desired and further allowed a 
representative of Mr. Fisher's to be in attendance at the natural 
mother's deposition to take notes. Mr. Fisher's paralegal, Sylvia 
Bundrandt sat in on the natural mother's deposition and took notes, 
and Affiant is unaware of any subsequent attempt by Mr. Fisher to 
pursue any cross-examination. 
15. In response to the allegations of Richard C. Coxson as 
contained in his Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial 
Under Rule 59, Affiant states that he was in attendance at the 
March 11, 1993, hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 
41(b), U.R.Civ.P., and that during that hearing, counsel for all 
parties, including Mr. Coxson, were given a full opportunity to 
engage in argument and rebuttal argument. Further, Affiant 
assisted in the preparation of Defendant Nielsen & Senior's motion 
to dismiss and the memorandum in support of that motion. Affiant 
has reviewed said documents and, in Affiant1 s opinion, no 
misrepresentations of law or fact are contained therein. Affiant 
also assisted in the preparation of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and has reviewed the same. Again, to the best 
of Affiant's knowledge, no misrepresentations of law or fact are 
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contained therein. Finally, Affiant denies that any of the 
Defendants or their attorneys have misrepresented any facts to this 
Court, or have engaged in any misconduct or misbehavior. Affiant 
denies that the Honorable Venoy Christoffersen engaged in any 
misconduct or was a party to any misrepresentations. 
16. In response to paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum, 
Affiant denies that the deposition of Plaintiff James Johnson was 
delayed because of Defendants, for the reasons set forth in 
paragraph 6 above. 
17. In response to paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum, 
Affiant denies that Plaintiffs have had only three attorneys and 
that the number of attorneys retained by Plaintiffs is irrelevant. 
These assertions are contrary to the findings of fact previously 
submitted to this Court and to which Plaintiffs failed to object. 
18• In response to paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's Memorandum, 
Affiant states that Mr. Coxson was not present at the July 12, 
1991, scheduling conference in Logan, Utah, and therefore has no 
knowledge as to what was said or done. Affiant further states that 
at the July 12, 1991, scheduling conference Mr. Fisher failed and 
refused to engage in any meaningful discussion as to resolution of 
the case, citing his lack of familiarity with the case. 
19. In response to paragraph 4 of Plaintiff's Memorandum, 
\ffiant denies that Defendants "vigorously opposed having their 
iepositions taken until the completion of the Deposition of James 
and Jennifer Johnson," for the reasons previously set forth herein, 
defendant Nielsen & Senior opposed the taking of the depositions of 
-17-
9300.NI211.8500 
the attorneys defending it, and filed an appropriate motion for 
protective order. The motion for protective order was wholly 
unrelated to the agreement between the parties as to the order of 
depositions. 
20. In response to paragraphs 6, 8 and 9 of Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum, regarding the dates and circumstances surrounding 
Defendant Pat Brian's deposition, Affiant denies the same for the 
reasons previously set forth herein. 
21. In response to paragraph 11 of Plaintiff's Memorandum, 
Affiant denies that "Defendants did not reveal the name of their 
expert until shortly before discovery cut off in January 1992" and 
that "Defendants refused to schedule a deposition until April of 
1992, shortly before trial scheduled for May 5-14 of 1992." 
Defendants filed their Designation of Expert Witnesses on 
November 15, 1991/ pursuant to this Court's Order. [See Record.] 
The witnesses named included Brent L. Hoggan, Esq., Lewis A. 
Moench, M.D., and L. Deane Smith, CPA. Plaintiffs have never taken 
any action to schedule the depositions of Dr. Moench or Mr. Smith. 
Plaintiffs took no action to schedule the deposition of Mr. Hoggan 
until April 15, 1991, just two weeks prior to discovery cutoff. 
(See Affidavit of Sylvia Bundrandt, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit 15.) Mr. Fisher claims to have had a conflict on 
the only date on which Mr. Hoggan was available to be deposed prior 
to discovery cutoff. (See Affidavit of Darwin Fisher, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit 16.) Defendant Nielsen & 
Senior and its counsel cooperated with Mr. Fisher in his taking the 
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deposition of Mr. Hoggan, one of Defendants expert witnesses, 
beyond the time for discovery cutoff, despite the fact that 
Plaintiffs had known the identity of Defendants* expert witnesses 
for five (5) months, during which time no attempt was made by 
Plaintiffs to contact such witnesses. (See Affiant's May 5, 1992, 
letter and Michael Dowdle's May 7, 1992, letter, copies of which 
are attached hereto as Exhibit 17.) 
22. In response to paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum, 
Affiant denies that the "May trial date was not stricken due to 
lack of preparation for trial- by Plaintiffs' counsel, for the 
reasons previously set forth herein. 
23. In response to paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum, 
Affiant denies the reason no trial was held in November 1992 is 
because "the Court failed to schedule" it, for the reasons 
previously set forth herein, and further denies that the Court 
refused, at any time, to set trial. 
24. In response to paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum, 
Affiant denies that Defendants made any representations to 
Mr. Fisher or to the Court that June 30, 1992, was the only date 
before trial that Defendants could take the deposition of the 
natural mother, for the reasons previously set forth herein. 
Affiant further states that Plaintiffs did oppose the taking of 
Mrs. Magleby's deposition, that Mr. Fisher offered dates in July 
1992 for the taking of the deposition, and that Defendants were 
required to obtain an order from the Court to proceed with the 
deposition as scheduled. 
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DATED t h i s J f i ^ d a y of A p r i l , 1993. 
LARR 
ih 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 7J\ day of April, 
1992, 
My Address and Commission 
ltionN<EJE6ffQT BLQBfcK: 
VAxJtL U). C^>(AS A^Jyyy^ 
PAULA W. LARSEN 
60 E. South Tcmpto #1100 
S*ttUk#Clty,UUh $4111 
My CommiMiofi €x*f t t 
Ju<»23.1996 
OTATg OF UTAH L 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
:ERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ffQVday of April, 1993, I have 
served the AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY L, WHYTE by causing a true and 
correct copy of the same to be sent, through the United States 
mails, first-class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Richard C. Coxson, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
275 North Main 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
39300.N1211.8500 
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CONDER & WANGSGARD 
4059 SOUTH 4000 WEST 
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 8412^' 
D D. CONDER TELEPHONE: 
R. WANGSGARD (801) 967-5500 
. BENNETT FACSIMILE: 
rnJER (801) 967-5563 
..ROGNUE 
December "" ^990 
Larry L. Whyte 
Nielson & Senior 
100 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah fH I I L 
Johnson's v.. Nielson & Senior, et» al, 
Hoar lj»"i! vy i 
Enclosed is a letter 1 recently received from Dr. Ralph 
Gant. Based upon the information and opinion stated in that 
letter, it appears that Mr* Johnson will not be available to 
complete his deposition until sometime after the first of the 
year. Please call me at your earliest convenience so that we may 
discuss the scheduling of his deposition. 
Very yfltri^v^Yours, 
PLR/11 
Enclosures 
EXHIBIT 1 
ASSOCIATED CLINICAL SERVICES 
RALPH W. GANT, Ph.D., PSYCHOLOGIST 
PLAZA 4500 
716 EAST 4500 SOUTH, SUITE N150 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107-3080 
(801) 263-1103 
December 7, 1990 
Mr. Pf0rr:^S^m^4^^^e 4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, UT 84120 
RE: Mr. Steven Davis 
9866 North Meadow Lane 
Highland, UT 84003 
Dear Mr. Rognlie: 
I have reviewed the reported conditions of Mr. Steven Davis during 
the deposition in which he participated on November 28, 29, and 
30th. I met with Mr* Davis and his wife on December 1, 1990. I 
saw them again on December 4, 1990. On both occasions Mr. Davis 
presented with extreme stress, including severe depression, and 
significant evidence of an anxiety state with possible episodes of 
panic. In reviewing Mr. Davis's reported behavior during that 
three-day period, and again on into December 1, 1990, Mr. Davis 
exhibited significant signs of depersonalization, a condition in 
which Mr. Davis was probably detached from his own behavior. He 
reported a strange, perception of "not being myself, not being in 
control of myself." His wife stated that she had never before seen 
him in such stress during their years of acquaintance and marriage. 
During the December 1, 1990 interview I recommended that Mr. Davis 
consult his physician regarding his stress. I received a phone 
call on December 4, 1990 for Doran Porter, M.D., 2230 North 
University Parkway., Ste. 1-A, Provo, UT 84604. Dr. Porter and 
I discussed Mr. Davis's extreme presenting stress, and Dr. Porter's 
intention to prescribe Welbutrin for depression, and one of^  the 
benzoidazepines to assist Mr. Davis in managing his anxiety and his 
symptoms of panic. 
Given Mr. Davis's extremely stressful conditions during those three 
days of deposition, I request your postponement of any further 
4eposition until there has been time to fully assess Mr. Davis's 
presenting conditions and to determine whether or not Mr. Davis 
will be able to continue the deposition in the near future. 
Page 2 
Mr- Rognlie, Esq, 
RE: Mr. Steven Davis 
On December 1, 1990, on-reviewing Mr* Davis's current conditions 
and his mental status, it was my feeling that we should first 
attempt medical management of his stress over the next few weeks, 
with supportive psychotherapy* Failing this, I will hospitalize 
Mr. Davis until in my judgement his stressful condition no longer 
constitutes a real danger to himself-
JPlease call me if you have any questions related to this matter* 
Res-pec Wully, 
Ral^h^fo 
Psychology 
RWG/bs 
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ty A, Jackson 
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V ^ / Attorneys & Co<jns«lor« 
Since 1882 
Suite 1100, Eagle Cate Plaza & Office lower 
60 Ease South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 64111 
Post Office 8ox 11808, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 - Telecopier (801) 532 1913 
A Professional Corporation 
tdwin W. Senior (1862-1925) 
Clair M. Senior (1901 -1965) 
Senior Counsel 
Hugh C. Carnef 
March 1 2 , 1991 
Of Counsel 
Raymond T. Senior 
Licensed to Practice in 
© Arizona 
* California 
t Navajo Bar 
t New York 
• Washington, O.C. 
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. 
ALLEN, NELSON, HARDY & EVANS 
215 South State #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
UK J(iliuboij, e l d L v.. N i e l s e n & S e n i o r , e t a l . 
Dear Mike: 
Pursuant to your recent request,
 enc]_oseci please find a copy 
of the transcript of the deposition of James A, Johnson taken 
November 28 through November 30 , 1990. You will note that there 
are three volumes to this deposition. Also enclosed please find 
deposition summaries of each of the three volumes which we have 
had our paralegals prepare in this matter and a memo which has 
been prepared regarding the misspelled words and errors that 
currently exist in the deposition. We have made the Court 
Reporter aware of these errors and she is correcting them 
apparently, and will send us a now ropy of the deposition when 
it's prepared. 
Hopefully this copy of the deposition transcript as well as 
the copies of the deposition summary will aid you in preparing 
for Mr. Davis* upcoming deposition. As indicated to you this 
morning on the telephonef we will refrain from taking any further 
action in this matter until* Friday by virtue of an agreement 
reached between Arthur and. Mr. Irvine, Mr. Davis' proposed 
counsel. 
If we can be of further assistance, please i 
\ i' on tact us, 
LLW:pr 
Enclosures 
Very t ru 1 y y\"\\ L
 i( 
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March 
A Professional Corporation 
Edwin W. Senior (1862-1925) 
Clair M. Senior (1901-1965) 
Senior Counsel 
Hugh C Carrier 
Of Counsel 
Raymond T. Senior 
Licensed to Practice in 
e Arizona 
* California 
t Navajo Bar 
• New York 
• Washington,, O.C 
)avid R. Irvine, Esq. 
349 South 200 Eastr Suite 1.70 
3alt Lake City, UT 84111 
IE: Johnsonf el a I Uielsen & Senior, etaL 
)c in M . Irvine: 
On March 1
 f 1991 r Plaintiffs represented to me that they had 
eearned you to represent them in the above-referenced matter, 
'hereafter, both Arthur Nielsen and I left telephone messages for 
ou which culminated in two telephone conversations between you 
nd Arthur Nielsen, one or about March 7, 1991# and the other on 
r about March 12, 1991. After your telephone conversation with 
rthur Nielsen on or about March 12 , 1991, we expected to hear" 
ack from you by March 15 , 1991, as to whether or not you would 
e making an appearance in this matter. Having heard no word 
rom you, despite several telephone messages having been left 
ith your office, we can only presume that you do not represent 
he plaintiffs in this matter. As such, we must proceed forward 
5 if the plaintiffs arp not- represented by counsel. 
As a courtesy 
Dcuments: 
we enclose copies of I I %* i f i i ! 2 %rc 
< n.ir<i ,: I ( in ' in ii1 iii\J 
1« Amended Notice of Continuance of Deposition, noticing 
up the depositions " plaintiffs beginning March 
28, 1991. 
2. 
3. 
Subpoena Duces Tecum for the taking of tue 
of Walter R. "Budw Ellett for March 28, 1991, 
Subpoena Duces Tecum for the takio* 
of Brad Englund for March 28, 1991. 
1 I l 
>n 
• i o n , 
EXHIBIT 3 
David R. I r v i n e , Esq* 
March 20 , 1991 
Page 2 
4* N o t i c e t o S u b m i t f o r D e c i s i o n Motion of D e f e n d a n t 
N i e l s e n & S e n i o r t o Compel 
We l o o k f o r w a r d t o r e c e i v i n g a copy of t h e N o t i c e o f 
Appearance i n t h i s m a t t e r s h o u l d you decide t o r e p r e s e n t t h e 
p l a i n t i f f s * 
Very t r u l y yours , 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
LLW:tbf 
End, 
cc: James A. and Jennifer L. Johnson (w/encl.) 
Chris L. Schmutzr Esq. (w/encl.) 
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. (w/encl.) 
ASSOCIATED CLINICAL SERVICES 
RALPH W. GANT, Ph. D . , PSYCHOLOGJ S 
PLAZA 4500 
I EAST 4500 SOUTH, SUITE N150 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107-3080 
(801) 263-1103 
tni 
March 21, 19 91 
The Honorable VeNoy Christot'lersen 
Attn: Pam Blackura 
140 North 100 West 
Logan, UT 84321 
I Steve Davis 
9866 North Meadow Lane 
Hiland, I JT 8 4 003 
Dear Judge Christoffersen: 
Mr. Steve Davis, who has been given notice of Continuance Of 
Deposition for the date of 03-28-91, Is in no condition to 
participate in such a stressful experience. Mr. Davis, who is in 
severe major depression, was on the anti-depressant: Wellbutrin, 
prescribed by Dr. Doran Porter. However, unfortunately, Mr* Davis 
has been unable to afford the medication and, in fact, has been off 
the medication for a period of about forty-seven days. While Mr. 
Davis has just now been able to obtain funds to purchase the 
medication, the effect of the medication will probably not be 
stabilized by the date and hour indicated on the notice dated 03-
?n-91. 
behalf of my patient, Mr. Steve Davis, ± respectfully request 
that this Continuance Of Deposition be postponed for a period of 
approximatelyonfe-monthuntilthe medication effects have 
stabilized, and until I have been able to work with Mr* Davis more 
on the problem of mis extreme stress reaction to this process. 
cease call me at/2 6 3-110 3 ii y m In 
A 
in i II i i i iiv q u e s t i o n s . 
Gant, Ph.D. 
g i s t , L i e , l . i l t 
RWG/bs 
M i 
EXHIBIT 4 
JAMES A JOHNSON 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON 
PO BOX 1841 
Orem, Utah 84059-1841 
Arthur II. Nielsen 
Larry L. Whyte 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
60 East South Temple, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah P^in 
FAX (801) 532-1913 
lie: Depositions of the Johnsons 
Gentlemen: 
We received notice of our Depositions on March 22, 1991 and 
respectfully request that they be rescheduled for the following 
reasons: 
1 ..~ —.^
 stili in the fi nal stages of negotiations for 
legal representation. We have a rough draft in hand and it 
should be finalized in the near future. A unexpected delay has 
been th possibly of a co-counsel moving out of state. 
2. g e c a u s e 0f the withdrawal of counsel of Condei & 
Wangsgard, we are in a "fee arbitration" dispute before the Utah 
State Bar. Until this fee dispute is resolved, some attornies 
are hesitant t~o consider *-~ represent us. 
3 Ralph Gantf .-^ **«*, requested ad recommended 
directly to Judge Christoffersen that our lepositions be 
postponed for another 30 days. When we are in receipt of a copy 
of this recommendation, we will forward it to you. 
4^ M o s t a ^ 0f the week of March 26th, Defendant James A. 
Johnson will be out-of-town. It is doubtful that he will be able 
to change his schedule. 
Sincerely, 
'ames A. Jorayson Jennifer L 3&M& 
cc: Michael L. Dowdle, i 
Ghris L. Schmutz 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen 
EXfflBIT 5 
uir H. Nielsen 
Y A. Weston 
|ay Peck 
USabin 
on |. Morris** 
tennis kkes«t 
k H. Anderson* 
ent Ludlow 
ird M. Hymas 
•C Mangum 
trdlGHincks 
S.Hyde 
jft P.-f aust 
. Mohlman 
Vrm P. Fineshriber 
LWhyte« 
« F. Attrede 
A. Jackson 
ia t_ LaTutippe 
IELSEN 
ENIOR 
Attorneys It Counselors 
Since 1M2 
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Ptaza & Office Tower 
60 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 64111 
Post Office Box 11608, Salt Uke City, Utah 64147 
Telephone: (601) 532-1900 - Telecopier (601) S32-1913 
July 5, 1991 
A Professional Corporation 
Edwin W. Senior 0662-1925) 
CUir M. Senior (1901-1965) 
Senior Counsel 
Hugh C Carner 
Of Counsel 
Raymond T. Senior 
Licensed to Practice in 
• Arizona 
• California 
t Navajo 8ar 
t New York 
• Washington, O.C 
SENT VIA FACSIMILE AND FIRST CLASS MAIL 
Darwin C. Fisherr Esq. 
NIELSON, HILL & FISHER 
Jamestown Square# Suite #200 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Re: James A. Johnson, et al. v, Nielsen & Senior, et al, 
Civil No* 900400460 
)ear Darwin: 
Enclosed please find a Notice of Continuance, continuing 
'our clients1 depositions without date in the above-referenced 
latter. This action was taken as a result of the re-scheduling 
>f the settlement conference until July 12, 1991• 
Inasmuch as it has been our understanding as well as the 
greement of the parties since the commencement of this action, 
hat Pat B. Brian1s deposition would not be taken until we 
onclude taking your clients1 depositions, we presume that his 
eposition which was previously scheduled for July 19 and 20 
hall likewise be continued without date and shall be taken at 
ome time following our completion of the taking of your clients1 
epositions. 
We would remind you that the Settlement Conference currently 
cheduled for July 12, 1991, at 4:00 p.m., before Judge 
iristofferson will be ineffectual as to the resolution of this 
itter unless you immediately provide us a detailed summary of 
>ur clients damages with back-up documentation* As you know, we 
ive previously requested this material on numerous occasions and 
>u have indicated to me that you would provide it to us prior to 
te settlement conference. We therefore look forward with much 
iticipation to this long awaited information. 
EXHIBIT 6 
Finallyr having received no response to our June 26, 1991/ 
letter we would remind you that we expect the immediate 
production of the documents requested therein. You are advised 
that the documents which we are demanding production of were 
ordered to be produced by the court pursuant to our motion to 
compel* Failure to produce these documents prior to July 12, 
1991, will leave us with no alternative but to bring this matter 
before the court at the time of the settlement conference seeking 
the appropriate sanctions* We would hope that this course of 
action would not be necessary. 
Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please 
feel free to call me. 
Very truly yours, 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
LLW.lls 
Enclosure 
cc: Michael L. Dowdle (w/Encl.) 
Chris L. Schmutz (w/Encl*) 
13232.NI211.LS 
N.IE 
^<$£ 
LSEN 
ENIOR 
thur H. Nielsen 
iry A. Weston 
ri Jay Peck 
itt R. Sabin 
Iton |. Morris** 
Dennis lckes«t 
irk H. Anderson* 
Kent Ludlow 
lhard M. Hymas 
in K. Mangum 
hard K. Hincks 
el S. Hyde 
iett P.-f aust 
R. Mohlman 
rilynn P. Fineshriber 
ry L. Whyte • 
/en F. All red© 
y A. Jackson 
icia L. LaTulippe 
V^^/ Attorneys A Counselors 
Since 1632 
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Plaza & Office Tower 
60 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Post Office Box 11806, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 - Telecopier (801) S32-1913 
August 21, 1991 
A Professional Corporation 
Edwin W. Senior (1862-1925) 
Clair M. Senior (1901-1965) 
Senior Counsel 
Hugh C. Garner 
Of Counsel 
Raymond T. Senior 
Licensed to Practice in 
© Arizona 
* California 
t Navajo Bar 
t New York 
• Washington, O.C. 
Darwin C, Fisher, Esq-
NIELSON, HILL & FISHER 
3319 North University Avenue, Suite #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
RE: Johnson, et al. v. Nielsen & Senior, et aL 
Deposition of Steven C. Davis 
Dear Mr, Fisher: 
On or about January 9, 1991, we received notification from 
your client's prior counsel that your client was unable to 
continue with the taking of his deposition due to a psychological 
problem. This position was supported by a letter dated December 
7, 1990 from Ralph W. Gant, a copy of which is enclosed for your 
convenience. 
In order for us to continue with your client's deposition, 
we believe it is necessary to obtain written verification from 
Mr* Gant of your client's psychological and/or emotional well 
being, in light of his alleged condition. In light of the short 
time remaining for discovery in this matter, we look forward to 
receiving this verification as soon as possible, particularly 
since we need to complete the taking of your client's depositions 
before the taking of any others. 
Thank you for your anticipated cooperation in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
LLW:pr 
c c : Michael L. Dowdle 
Chris L. Schmutz 
Larry^L, Whyte 
EXHIBIT 7 
LAW OFFICES 
CONDER & WANGSGAKD 
4059 SOUTH 4000 WEST 
WEST VAIUY CITY. UTAH 8<i2(Moy9 
TELEPHONE: 
(601) 9*7-5300 
FACSTMUS: 
December 11, 1990 
Michael L. Dovdle, Esq* 
Allanf Nelson, Hardy & Evans 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Johnson's v« Nielsen & Senior/ et« al„ 
Dear Mike: 
Enclosed is the letter from Dr. Ralph W, Gant I discussed 
with you today. As 1 mentioned/ because of the apparent delay in 
completing the deposition of Mr* Johnson, I do not anticipate 
taking Judge Brian%A deposition before February, 1990. 
PLR/11 
Enclosure 
JERHAlD D. CONDE* 
SCOTT fL VANGSGAUD 
KMKC BENNETT 
L.G.CUUER 
ftlBR L ROGNU£ 
EXHIBIT 8 
Dououis A. NIKLSON. P.C. 
RICHARD L. HIIX. P.C. 
JcrrRKY R. Hiu . P.C. 
DARWZK C FXSKKK. P.C* 
T. MCKAY STIRLAKD** 
NIELSON, HILL 6C FISHER 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
3319 NORTH UNIVERSITY AVENUE 
SUITE 2 0 0 
P H O V O , UTAJBC 8 4 6 0 4 
*AX90 AOMRTED IK WASH IKOTOK 
**AXSO ADMITTED IK ARIZONA 
TELEPHONE 801-375-eeoo 
TELECOPIER 80 i -37s -38as 
August 16, 1991 
Larry Whyte 
Nielson and Senior 
60 East South Temple #1100 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111 
Re: Johnson v Nielson and Senior 
Dear Larry, 
I would like to take the depositions of Art Nielson, Gary 
Weston, Richard Hymas and yourself following my client's 
Depositions and the depositions already scheduled for Judge Brian 
and Chris Schmutz. 
Would you please check the schedules of those individuals and 
notify me of the dates that they would be available • I do not 
anticipate that depositions will be lengthy and should be concluded 
within a day or a day and a half* I will be attending a seminar 
the 11th, 12th , and 13th of September and will not be available for 
the taking of those depositions. 
Please give me a call at your earliest convenience so that we 
may coordinate our calendars. 
Thank you, 
Very truly yours, 
Darwin C. Fisher 
Attorney at Law 
DCF/sab 
f:\fiahltr\whyte.814 
EXHIBIT 9 
rthur H. Nielsen 
acy A. Weston 
d lay Peck 
-it R. Sabin 
ilton |. Morris*t 
Dennis lckes*t 
ark H. Anderson* 
Kent Ludlow 
:hard M. Hymas 
hn K. Mangum 
rhard K. Hincks 
>d S. Hyde 
beet P.-Faust 
' R. Mohlman 
irilynn P. Fineshriber 
ty L. Whyte • 
!veti F. Allred© 
ty A. Jackson 
ricia L. LaTulippe 
ME 
<ss 
I LSEN 
ENIOR 
V ^ / Attorneys A Counselors 
Since 1882 
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Pizza & Office Tower 
60 East South Temple. Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Post Office Box 11806, Salt Lake City. Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 - Telecopier (801) 532-1913 
August 27 , 1991 
A Professional Corporation 
Edwin W. Senior (1862-1925) 
Clair M. Senior (1901-1965) 
Senior Counsel 
Hugh C. Garner 
Of Counsel 
Raymond T. Senior 
Licensed to Practice in 
© Arizona 
* California 
t Navajo Bar 
* New York 
* Washington. O.C. 
Darwin C. Fisher, Esq. 
NIELSON, HILL & FISHER 
3319 North University Avenue, Suite #200 
Provo, Utah 84064 
RE: Johnson. et al. v. Nielsen & Senior, et al, 
DEPOSITIONS 
Dear Mr, Fisher: 
I have had an opportunity to check with all counsel 
regarding the proposed dates for the taking of depositions. You 
are advised that the following dates are available for the taking 
of depositions: 
October 7 through 11, 1991 and November 18 through 22, 1991. 
With respect to your August 16, 1991 letter, you are advised 
that we object to, and will vigorously oppose, the taking of the 
depositions of Arthur Nielsen and Larry Whyte. We are unfamiliar 
with any authority allowing you to take the depositions of 
opposing counsel. It is also our inclination to object to your 
taking the depositions of Gary Weston and Richard Hymas. If you 
intend to pursue with the taking of any of these depositions, we 
would expect you to provide us with a detailed list of the 
proposed areas of inquiry and sufficient notice so that we might 
timely apply to the Court for a Protective Order. 
Sincerely, 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
LLW:pr 
EXHIBIT 10 
OOOLAS A. NIELSON, P C 
ICEAED L. HILL, P.C. 
crnucY R. HIIX. P.C 
A.RWIK C FlSHKR. P C * 
MCKAY STIRLAKD** 
NIELSON, H I L L & F I S H E R 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
331© NORTH UNIVERSITY AVENUE 
SUITE 2 0 0 
P R O V O , U T A H 8 4 6 0 4 
*ALSO ADKtTTtO IK WASKtNOTOK 
**AXSO AOKfTTYD IK ARIZONA 
TELEPHONE eoi-375-eeoo 
TELECOPIER 801-375-3865 
September 3 , 1991 
Larry Whyte 
Nielson and Senior 
60 E. South Temple #1100 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111 
Re: Johnson v Nielson & Senior 
Dear Lar£y# 
I am enclosing herewith Notice of Depositions* If there is a 
problem \*ith the dates and times, please contact me. 
It is my understanding that Arthur Nielson, Larry Whyte, 
Richard Hymas and Gary Weston are members of the law firm of 
Nielson and Senior who is a defendant in this matter* By being 
members of the law firm of Nielson and Senior they are subject to 
having their testimony taken by deposition* The fact that some of 
those individuals are also acting as defence counsel
 9 does not give 
them immunity to the taking of their depositions* I assume that 
the choice to serve as ones own attorney was made with full 
knowledge that those individual(s) may be called as witnesses* I 
have not objected to the fact that potential witness are also 
serving as attorneys in this matter and do not intend to do so. 
However# I do intend to take the deposition of all individuals I 
feel may have knowledge regarding this matter. 
I am sending to you the Notices of Depositions so you may 
apply for a Protective Order. 
Thank you. 
Very t r u l y yours f 
Darwin 
Attorney a t Law 
DCF/sab 
Enclosure 
EXHIBIT 11 1S)5ft 
NIE 
Sfi 
I LSEN 
ENIOR 
\^_J Attorneys it Counselors 
S<oce 1882 
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Plaza & Office Tower 
60 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Post Office Box 11808, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 - Telecopier (801) 532-1913 
A Professional Corporation 
Edwin W. Senior (1862-1925) 
Clair M. Senior (1901-1965) 
May 6, 1992 
Of Counsel 
Raymond T. Senior 
Milton J. Morris 
Also Licensed to Practice in 
e Arizona 
• California 
t Colorado 
X Idaho 
t Navajo 6ar 
O New Mexico 
• Washington, O.C. 
hur H. Nielsen 
y A. Weston 
I jay Peck 
old A. Ranquist"0 
I R. Sabin 
tennis lckes«t 
rfc H. Anderson* 
Cent Ludlow 
urd M. Hymas 
n K. Mangum 
wrd K. Hincks 
il S. Hyde 
•ect P. Faust 
raig Smith* 
R. Mohlman 
id B. Hartvigsen** 
Hynn P. Fineshriber 
yL.Whyte« 
* n F. Allrede 
la V. Priebe* 
icia L LaTulippe 
Darwin C. Fisher, Esq. 
HILL, HILL & FISHER 
3319 North University, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Re: Johnson, et al. v. Nielsen & Seniorr et al. 
Dear Darwin: 
This letter confirms our earlier conversation regarding the 
taking of the deposition of LizAnne Magleby. Now that you have 
completed your trial, we would appreciate your notifying us at 
your earliest convenience as to when you anticipate taking 
LizAnne*s deposition. As I have indicated to you previously, we 
would like to take the deposition of LizAnne prior to May 22, 
1992. We would appreciate your notifying us at your earliest 
convenience as to the date scheduled for LizAnne's deposition. 
If you are unable to schedule her deposition prior to May 22, 
1992/ please contact us immediately. 
Very truly yours, 
NIELSEN & SENIOR^ P.C. 
tortL/^W '^  
LLW/cas 
c c : Michael L. Dowdle 
cas: letr:12076.NI211.8500 
EXHIBIT 12 
Arttuif H. NIdsen 
C*ryA,W«*k»ri 
Ctrl J»y Peck 
H*oWA.«*mufce* 
Ne«*.S*h«i 
R. Dennis kke**t 
M*rkH.Andenon# 
ft, Kont Ludlow 
WcfurdM.Hymis 
jotwtK.Mangum 
Itiohifd K. Hindc* 
N o d 5 . Myd€ 
Robert p. Fwm 
|« Cr«4g Smith* 
/»y * . Mohtcmn 
0*v>d B. H*rtv%**t«i 
M*rHynn P. ftneibftbe/ 
Unyi .Whyt t« 
Steven F. Aft/to** 
f*tr'«ci« I . UTtHtppc 
IELSEN 
Attorneys A 
Since *»2 
Suite 1100, U$l* Cei€ PUo» it Offo* toww 
60 C*st South Terepte, S * Ufce Cfty, Uuh $4111 
POit OtCvx Box I 1 W , S*U U fe C ^ , OUh WH7 
Telephone: (301) 512-1W0 - Telecopier (KH) $12-1*13 
A fVofe*4tooa( Oxpomion 
Wvrfn W, Stddr C166MS2S) 
a * M. s«nk>r ( T W M K S ) 
OfCoimid 
Milton J. Monfc 
AUo Licensed ta Practice in 
* Areon* 
* CftltfotnU 
* CbUxido 
XUfeho 
t N*va|a ft*r 
ONcwMexJco 
« W4ihinglo«# O.C 
J u n e 4 , 1992 
Darwin C. F i s h e r , E s q . 
HILL, HILL & FISHER 
200 JAmestown S q u a r e 
3319 North U n i v e r s i t y Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
RE: Johnson , e t a l « , v« N i e l s e n & s e n i o r , e t a l -
Dear Darwin: 
WQ tried to you" reach you earlier in the week by telephone
 f but 
have been unable to talk with you. As such I am writing to notify 
you that we do not intend to wait until mid or late July to take 
LizAnne's deposition. Under the circumstances# such a wait is 
simply unacceptable. As such we intend to take her deposition some-
time this month. If you would like input on scheduling the date 
of her deposition please call. If we do not hear from you by 
Wednesdayi June 10, 1992 we will go ahead and schedule her deposition 
and send you notice of the same. 
Sincerelyr 
N i e l s e n & S e n i o r , p .C. 
c c : Michael Dowdle 
EXHIBIT 13 
H I L L , H I I X <& F I S H E R 
A T T O R N E Y S JLT "LAW 
JUCSLJL&D L. HILL. P .C 3CJL6 N O J £ £ K U K i W J t s r r v A.VXSTTS *AI*& ****&**, t* vt+MttworA* 
a*«w» a *c««*. p.c SUITE 2 0 0
 M . ^ W <^ ,^r~^*^ 
«T MfcK*v O t t u ^ v - M _ TKUKPKOKK 9 0 1 - O 7 O - 0 6 O O 
T. MtKxY S « « ^ * PROVO, UTAH 8 4 « 0 4 TELXCor«a *0l«*7*«a*> 
June 19r 1992 
Larry !*• Whyte 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Poet Office Box 11808 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111 
Re: Johnson v Nielsen & Senior# et al-
Dear Larry, 
I am writing you in pursuance to our telephone conversation of 
this morningf June 18, 1992 f concerning the scheduling of the 
deposition of Lizanne Engemann. As you recall, we spent some 
considerable time on the telephone discussing available dates and 
X had indicated to you that on June 30 I had depositions in another 
matter which had been scheduled for some period of time* I 
understand that you no longer have the list of dates that we 
covered on the telephone and therefore I am sending with this 
letter a listing of dates that I have available for the taking of 
Lizanne's deposition« 
I understand that Mr# Nielsen wishes to take Lizanne's 
deposition as quickly as possible and will be happy to cooperate 
and felt I had done so by supplying you with dates in our previous 
telephone conversation* 
If Mr. Nielsen will not agree to a new date for the 
deposition, please contact me immediately as I will need to contact 
Judge Christofferson and have him rule whether or not the 
deposition will take place on June 30, 1992. 
Please contact me at your earliest convenience regarding a new 
date* 
Thank you. 
Very truly yours 
"Darwin C. Fisher 
Attorney at Law 
DCP/sab 
EXHIBIT 14 
Mr, Fisher has the following dates open to attend the deposition of 
Lizanne EngemannJ 
July 13 
July 15-17 
July 20-24 
July 27-31 
Please contact our office as soon as another date is set so that we 
may reserve it on his calendar. The days are filling up quickly. 
NJELSEN 
"IENIOR 
^ 
Siittc 110G, €*&> C«t€ fitu L Of<k*To**r 
60 E**< Sooth T«i»pk, S*k Ufc* C t y Utih *411t 
* * 4 Of fk* Bo* t 1 4 * . Salt Ufa* CHy, Uuh 84147 
Tdephortt: (601) &M90O - Tclecopfcr (KM SS3-T* J 
June 24, 1992 
A frofctttooat Corporation 
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Senior Counsel 
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vift PACSTMlXg TRANSMISSION 
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U r r y L W h y t e * 
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Pitrfca L UTt/tippe 
Darwin C# Fisher, Esq. 
KILL, HILL 6 FISHER 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
3319 North University Avenue 
Prove, Utah 84604 
Re* Jphnsffflr-ftt al. y» NjglS.en & genjoyret njr 
Deposition of LisAnne Engemann Hagleby 
Dear Darwin; 
This letter serves to confirm my understanding following a 
telephone conference yesterday with Judge Christof fersen, Michael 
Dowdle, you and me. As you will recall, Judge Chriatoffersen 
Indicated that we could proceed with the taking of the deposition 
of ttlzAiuie Engemann Hagleby on June 30, 1992, despite your 
representation that you would not attend. Please be advised 
that we intend to move forward and take Mrs- Magleby's deposition 
on June 30th commencing at 9?30 a,iu at the place indicated in 
the Notice of Deposition, a copy of which you have previously 
received. You are invited to attend and cross examine the 
witness. 
Very truly yours, 
NIELSEN £ SENIOR, P.C. 
!<LW/cas 
cc : Michael L» Dowdle>/ 
ca*aetr!l21G6,HI211«850O 
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Darwin C. Fisher, Bar No. 1080 
HILL, HILL & FISHER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and ] 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, ! 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NIELSON & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation and PAT B. BRIAN, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SYLVIA BUNDRANT 
I Civil No. 900400460CN 
I Judge VeNoy Christofferson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss: 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
SYLVIA BUNDRANT, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and 
says: 
1* I am the paralegal/secretary for plaintiffs' counsel, 
Darwin C. Fisher. 
2. I am of adult years and competent to make this Affidavit • 
3. All the statements hereinafter set forth in this 
Affidavit are made by me on the basis of my personal and direct 
knowledge of the matter to which said statements pertain. If 
EXHIBIT 16 
called as a witness by a Court of competent jurisdiction, I am able 
and shall testify as to each and all of said matters in the manner 
hereinafter set forth in this Affidavit. 
4. I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the 
State of Utah and am over the age of 18 years • 
5. Your affiant tried to contact the defendants' expert 
witness, Mr. L. Brent Hoggan's secretary on the 15th day of April, 
1992, to try and set a time for his deposition. I was then 
informed by a return call from his office that he would not be 
available until the last week in April. 
6. Your affiant tried to contact the defendants' expert 
witness, Mr. Hoggan, on the 30th day of April, 1992 to try and set 
a time for his deposition and Mr. Hoggan was unavailable. 
DATED this T day of May, 1992. 
IA ATBUNTOANT 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
On this 7 
ss 
. day of May, 1992, personally appeared before me 
Sylvia A. Bundrant, signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
TONYA&ADAMS 
eae<*283 
OraMJtah W0S9 
My Coowfcsfoa&P&es: 8-22-94 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I personally mailed a copy of the 
foregoing on this y^1 day of JjltfJA' , 1992, by 
first-class, U«S« mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
c/o Mark Dowdle 
615 W. 200 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Arthur Nielsen 
Larry Whyte 
Nielsen & Senior 
60 E* South Temple #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
\clientdf \ john«on\«.f fidav. mmb 
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Darwin C. Fisher, Bar No. 1080 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and j 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, ] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation and PAT B. BRIAN, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DARWIN C. FISHER 
I Civil No. 900400460CN 
| Judge VeNoy Christofferson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss: 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Darwin C. Fisher, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states: 
1. I am the attorney for the Plaintiffs in the above 
entitled matter. 
2. I am of adult years and competent to make this Affidavit* 
All the statements hereinafter set forth in this Affidavit are made 
by me on the basis of my personal and direct knowledge of the 
matter to which said statements pertain* If called as a witness by 
1 
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a Court of competent jurisdiction, I am able and shall testify as 
to each and all of said matters in the manner hereinafter set forth 
in this Affidavit* 
3. I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the 
State of Utah and am over the age of 18 years• 
4. I was informed that Mr. L. Brent Hoggan, the defendants' 
expert witness, would not be available for the taking of his 
deposition until the last week of April, 1992. 
5. That your affiant contacted Mr. Whyte, counsel for 
Nielsen & Senior, and was told that defendants would not agree to 
an extension of the discovery cut-off date and the deposition of 
Mr. Hoggan must be taken within the last week of April, 1992 prior 
to May 1, 1992. 
6. That your affiant informed Mr. Whyte that he would make 
every effort in order to take Mr. Hoggan's deposition, however, 
your affiant was in trial from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. After 5:00 
p.m. your affiant was occupied in preparing for the next day's 
trial. That your affiant was unable to take the deposition during 
the last week of April, 1992, because of your affiant's involvement 
in trial in another matter* 
7* That defendants' counsel was fully aware that your 
affiant was to be involved in the jury trial from the 7th day of 
April, 1992, as defendants' counsel was working closely with the 
2 
counsel for the defendants in the other matter and knew that your 
affiant had entered an appearance to act as co-counsel in that 
matter• 
8* It is apparent to your affiant that defendants have 
prohibited the taking of the deposition of their expert witness by 
requiring the deposition to be taken the last few days of April 
1992* 
DATED this day of . 1992. 
Darwin C. Fisher 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On t h i s cT1 day of M/ZUf^ , 1992, personal ly 
appeared before me Darwin C. F i sher , s igner of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged t o me t h a t he executed the same. 
SYLVIA A. BUNDRANT Kownpwuc.miZitvw 
3319 HOaTHUNIVJWE. #200 
NELSON HILL &RSHER 
PR0VO.UTAH84G04 
COMM. EXP. 1-20-96 
HjL> MtUltOzUt/ 
Y PUBLIC 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing on this ^P day of 
, 1992, to the following: Maf y 
Arthur E. Nie l sen 
Larry L. Whyte 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
60 East South Temple #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Pat B. Brian 
c / o Michael L. Dowdle 
915 West 100 South 
S a l t Lake Ci ty , UT 84104 
James A. and Jennifer L« Johnson 
and a courtesy copy of same t o : 
The Honorable Venoy Christof ferson 
875 Rio Virgin #217 
St* George, Utah 84770 
11 \cl£«ntdf \davis«tv. ado\af fad* .dcf 
4 
wr H. Nielsen 
f A. Weston 
lay Peck 
>W A. Ranquist*0 
R. Sabin 
ennis lckes«t 
k. H. Anderson* 
snt Ludlow 
ud M. Hymas 
K. Mangum 
ifd K. Hincks 
S.Hyde 
i t P. Faust 
lig Smith* 
. Mohlman 
I B. Hartvigsen«* 
ynn P. Fineshnber 
LWhyte* 
« F. Allrede 
V. Priebe* 
la L LaTulippe 
NIE &£ 
I LSEN 
ENIOR FILE GOP 
i f Attorneys & Counselors 
^ " ^ S<«ce t«82 
Suite 1100, Eag(e Gate Plaza & Office Tower 
60 East South Temple, Salt lake City, Utah 84111 
Post Office Box 11806, Salt lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 - Telecopier (801) 532-1913 
May 5 , 1992 
A Professional Corporation 
Edwin W. Senior (1862-1925) 
Clair M. Senior (1901 -1965) 
Of Counsel 
Raymond T. Senior 
Milton J. Morris 
Also licensed to Practice in 
© Arizona 
* California 
t Colorado 
X Idaho 
t Navajo Bar 
O New Mexico 
• Washington, O.C. 
The Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen 
875 Rio Virgin, Suite 217 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Re: Johnson, et al. vs. Nielsen & Senior, et al. 
Civil No. 90-0400460-CN 
Dear Judge Christoffersen: 
We are in receipt of Plaintiffs* Motion for Enlargement of 
Time for the purpose of taking the deposition of L. Brent Hoggan. 
The Court is advised that the Defendants designated Mr. Hoggan as 
an expert witness in November 1991. Prior to April 15, 1992, 
Plaintiffs made no attempt to contact Mr. Hoggan or to schedule 
his deposition. Plaintiffs1 delay in taking Mr. Hoggan*s 
deposition is without excuse. Nevertheless, Defendant Nielsen & 
Senior does not object to Plaintiffs taking Mr. Hoggan's 
deposition beyond the discovery cutoff date, on the condition 
that the court fix a date certain, within a reasonable time 
period, by which said deposition shall be taken and that the 
discovery cutoff period not be extended for any other reason, 
except for the taking of LizAnne Magleby's deposition as 
previously stipulated by counsel. 
Should the Court have additional questions or concerns 
regarding this matter, please feel free to contact me. 
Very truly yours, 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
LLW:cp 
c c : Michael L. Dowdle 
Darwin C. F i s h e r 16296.NI211.1 
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1VJLICHAEL L. JDOWDLE 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR 
915 WEST 100 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84104 
TELEPHONE (801) 531-0060 TELECOPIER (801) 531-0346 
May 7,1992 
The Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen 
875 Rio Virgin Drive #217 
SL George, Utah 84770 
Re: Johnson v. Nielsen & Senior, et aL, Civil No. 900400460CN 
Dear Judge Christoffersen: 
This letter is in response to Plaintiffs* Motion for Enlargement of Time, seeking additional 
time to take the deposition of Bient Hoggan, designated expert witness for Defendants in this case. 
As the Court will note in the file of this case, Defendants designated Mr, Hoggan as an expert 
witness in November, 1991f in anticipation of the then-scheduled December trial date. Plaintiffs* 
first contact with Mr. Hoggan for the taking of his deposition was on or about April 15,1992. 
Plaintiffs made absolutely no attempt to take Mr. Hoggan's deposition prior to that time. We 
followed this situation with some interest, wondering when and if Plaintiffs would ever take his 
deposition. 
Notwithstanding the total lack of merit in the delay in the seeking of Mr. Hoggan's 
deposition, Defendant Brian will acquiesce in the belated scheduling, so long as it is clearly 
understood that the discovery cut-off now in effect with respect to the non-counterclaim related 
issues will remain in effect As Lany Whyte has noted in his letter to you dated May 5,1992, 
counsel have previously agreed that Ms. LizAnne E. Magleby may be deposed after the cutoff date 
as well, due to her non-appearance at her deposition earlier in April. Judge Brian objects to the 
continual procrastination of the prosecution of this case by Plaintiff s and their counsel. The cutoff 
dates previously set by die Court in this case should be adhered to by Plaintiffs just as much as 
they should by Defendants. Without the usual and ordinary adherence to cutoff and submission 
dates, preparation for trial in this case will be impossible. 
We appreciate the Court's patience in the ongoing saga of this case. Please let us know if 
we can be of assistance to the Court. 
Respectfully, . 
Michael L, Dawdle 
cc: Arthur H. Nielsen 
Larry L. Whyte 
Darwin C. Fisher 
TabF 
RICHARD C. COXSON (A5933) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
275 North Main 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
(801) 798-3574 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County. State of Utah 
CARMAjB^ITH, Clerk 
Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
•\ \JULA-
*\ 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation and PAT B. BRIAN, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 900400460CN 
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen 
The court having been fully apprised of the circumstances by 
motion and oral argument, enters the following findings of fact: 
1. In January, 1986, Defendant Pat B. Brian 
(a) was a member of the firm of Nielsen & Senior; 
(b) was retained by Plaintiffs to represent them in the 
adoption of a child to be born in June, 1986f 
(c) met with the birth mother and obtained her 
preliminary commitment to place her child for 
adoption by the Plaintiffs. 
2. Following the birth of the child on June 26, 1986, in 
Texas, the child was returned to the State of Utah and placed in 
the custody of the Plaintiffs. 
3. Since on or about June 27, 1986, when said child was 
delivered to Plaintiffs, it has never been out of the custody, care 
and control of the Plaintiffs. 
4. On or about December 19, 1986, the Petitioner for 
Adoption by Plaintiffs was filed by Defendant Nielsen & Seniorm 
5. On or about June 23, 1987, Defendant Nielsen & Senior was 
informed by the birth mother that she would not give her consent to 
the adoption and wished to regain custody of the child. 
6. Plaintiffs were immediately informed of the birth 
mother's intention and they sought other counsel who, thereafter 
represented them with regard to the adoption. 
7. Between July 1, 1987 and the middle of October, 1987, 
there was considerable activity, including court appearances and, 
finally, negotiations which resulted in the birth mother being paid 
approximately $10,000.00 for alleged expenses she claimed to have 
incurred,d including attorney's fees, and the birth mother executed 
her formal consent to the adoption. 
8. On October 16, 1987, the Decree of Adoption was entered 
by the court and the adoption was completed. 
9. In November, 1987, Plaintiffs, through their then 
counsel, Mark F. Robinson, contacted Defendants to assert claims 
for several thousand dollars allegedly incurred by Plaintiffs in 
finalizing the adoption at issue in this case. Shortly thereafter, 
Plaintiffs wrote a letter to Defendants Nielsen & Senior and Pat 
Brian demanding they be paid damages for the alleged improper 
handling of the adoption. 
10. In August, 1988, D. David Lambert of the law firm of 
Howard, Lewis and Petersen in Provo, made contact with Defendants 
to assert Plaintiffs' claims regarding the adoption. 
11- Thereafter, direct contact was had with Plaintiffs by 
Defendants and negotiations were conducted between the parties. 
12. Plaintiffs filed an original complaint, pro se on June 
22, 1990. 
13. On or about July 2, 1990, plaintiffs filed their first 
Amended Complaint. 
14. Defendants answered the first Amended Complaint on or 
about July 30, 1990. 
15. Defendant Nielsen & Senior noticed plaintiffs that 
depositions were to commence on August 17, 1990. 
16. On August 16, 1990, Gerald D. Conder and Peter L. Rognlie 
of the firm of Conder & Wangsgard entered appearance and 
depositions were postponed. 
17. On or about September 12, 1990, Conder & Wangsgard filed 
plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. 
18. The deposition of plaintiff James Johnson began on 
November 28, 1990. The deposition lasted for three (3) days, after 
which the deposition was adjourned due to Mr. Johnson being ill. 
19. On or about January 16, 1991, Conder & Wangsgard withdrew 
as counsel for plaintiffs, and Defendant Nielsen & Senior sent out 
a notice to appoint counsel or to appear in person on January 18, 
1991 . 
20. On March 21, 1991, David R. Irvine wrote to Defendant 
Nielsen & Senior indicating that he had been contacted by and 
anticipated entered his appearance as counsel of record for, 
plaintiffs. Mr. Irvine did not thereafter enter appearance. 
21. A scheduling conference was schedule by the court for 
April 16, 1991. The conference was continued at the instance of 
Darwin C. Fisher, of Nielsen, Hill & Fisher, who entered appearance 
on behalf of plaintiffs on April 15, 1991. 
22. A new scheduling and settlement conference was scheduled 
by the court for June 26, 1991, in Logan, Utah. This conference was 
held, however, on July 12, 1991. Settlement was not achieved at 
this conference, partially due to the need of counsel for 
plaintiffs to familiarize himself with the case. 
23. A Scheduling Order was entered on August 13. 1991 . 
setting discovery and motion cutoff, expert witness designation and 
pretrial conference dates, and a trial date of February 3-10, 1992. 
The Order also required that a Pre-trial Order be submitted on or 
before January 13, 1992. Defendants' repeated efforts to obtain the 
stipulation of plaintiffs' counsel to a proposed Pre-trial Order 
were unsuccessful. Plaintiffs never submitted a proposed Pre-trial 
Order to the court. 
24. Plaintiff James Johnson's deposition by defendants was 
delayed until October 10, 1991, and completed on October 11, 1991. 
25. At a hearing in St. George, Utah on December 6, 1991, 
regarding Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Mr. Fisher requested delay 
of trial set for February 3-10, 1992 until later than month which 
was granted and the trial set for February 18, 1992. 
26. Defendant Pat B. Brian then was granted leave in January 
of 1992 to file a counterclaim. Counsel for plaintiffs, moved, and 
was granted, a new trial date of May 5-14, 1992 in order to 
adequately respond to Defendant Pat B. Brian's counterclaim 
27. In February of 1992, the court disposed of certain cause 
of action in Plaintiffs5 Second Amended Complaint, and granted the 
same, narrowing the cause of action to professional negligence and 
breach of contract. 
28. Counsel for plaintiffs, in April of 1992, petitioned the 
court to strike trial date set for May due to uncompleted 
discovery. 
29. Defendants opposed the motion of plaintiffs, but a new 
trial date was set for November 2-13, 1992, with a discovery cutoff 
date of May 1, 1992. 
30. In April of 1992, counsel for plaintiffs filed a petition 
for permission to appeal from and Interlocutory order of the trial 
court dismissing certain causes of action. 
31. On April 7, 1992, this court entered an order striking 
the scheduling order, and continuing the trial, without date. 
32. The Utah Supreme Court denied plaintiff's Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal on May 21, 1992. 
33. Plaintiffs moved to extend the discovery cutoff date set 
by the court set for May 1, 1992. The court denied plaintiffs' 
request and stated in its Memorandum in Decision dated May 20, 1992 
that no exception would be permitted. Defendants opposed Lizanne 
Magleby on June 30, 1992 without participation of plaintiffs, 
pursuant to an order by this court, in spite of the fact that 
counsel for plaintiffs was unable to attend. 
34. Plaintiffs have taken no action to move this case forward 
since plaintiffs took the deposition of Brent Hoggan in May of 
1992. 
35. The deposition of Ms. Magleby, by defendants, was the 
last action on this case. 
36. On or about October 5, 1992, Darwin C. Fisher moved for 
leave to withdraw as plaintiffs* counsel. 
37. Richard C. Coxson entered appearance on behalf of 
plaintiffs on October 26, 1992. 
38. Leave to withdraw was granted by the court on November 
19, 1992. 
39. Conduct of the defendants has been satisfactory in moving 
the case toward trial having fully cooperated at all times, and 
have tried to bring it to an early resolution and trial. 
40. Plaintiffs have failed to abide by the court's orders to 
move the case forward and seeking to expand the scope of the 
action. 
41. During the nearly three years this case has been pending, 
plaintiffs have violated the court's orders setting the date by 
which discovery must be completed, repeatedly made changes of 
counsel requiring the court to educate counsel regarding the facts 
and posture of the case, and, most recently, have alluded to 
further amendment and broadening of the claims as originally set 
forth by Plaintiffs5 complaint. 
1 fi&fi 
42. Plaintiffs are now represented by their seventh attorney 
and plaintiffs' failure to maintain counsel has resulted in 
prejudice to the defendants. 
43. The issue remaining to be litigated in this matter is the 
claimed negligence and/or breach of contract by defendants in 
connection with plaintiffs' adoption of the minor child. 
44. Any damages suffered by plaintiffs, which defendant 
dispute, would have been incurred during the three and one-half 
months approximately from July 1, 1987 to October 15, 1987 when the 
dispute over the adoption was settled. 
Having made its Findings of Fact, the court now enters: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure empowers 
this court to dismiss an action, with prejudice for failure of the 
plaintiffs to prosecute. 
2. Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within 
the broad discretion of the trial court. 
3. The single issue presently before the court is whether 
the Motion to Dismiss is sufficiently supported by the facts of the 
case and any allegations of the plaintiffs regarding contacts with 
or by ecclesiastical authorities or with state and federal agencies 
are not relevant to Defendants' Motion and will not be considered 
by the court. 
4. The factors to be considered in determining whether 
dismissal for failure to prosecute is appropriate are set forth in 
Uest inghouse Electrical Suppl y_Co^. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor ^ 
Inc. 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) and restated by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App . 1989). 
5. The court has considered those factors in determining 
whether to grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, as follow: 
a. With respect to Factor (1), the Lapse of Time, the court 
concludes that a considerable lapse of time has occurred in this 
case, almost five and one-half years since the claims were first 
made by plaintiffs against defendants, and over two and one-half 
years since the filing of the original complaint. While this is not 
the deciding factor in the court's analysis, it is of significance 
to the court. 
b. With respect to Factor ( 2 ) , the Conduct of the Parties, 
the court concludes that defendants have consistently and 
continuously moved the case forward through conducting discovery, 
narrowing the scope and the case through pre-trial motions, and 
cooperating with the court and opposing counsel in adherence to 
court cut-off dates and deadlines. In contrast, plaintiffs have 
persisted in delaying and prolonging the prosecution of the case 
through the regular replacement of counsel, requiring re-education 
of new counsel in each instance, and through continual and 
persistent attempt to extend cut-off dates and deadlines, to expand 
the scope of discovery and to introduce new issues into the case. 
Weighing the conduct of the parties, the court concludes that this 
factor weighs heavily in favor of defendants. 
IS 
c. With respect to Factors (3) and (4), the Opportunity to 
Move the Case Forward and the Actions of the Parties to Do So, the 
court concludes that all parties in this case have had equal 
opportunity to move the case forward to trial. For the same reasons 
as stated in subparagraph (b) above, the court concludes that 
defendants have taken advantage of their opportunity to move the 
case forward in every instance. In contrast, and in the face of 
their primary burden to do so, plaintiffs have failed to move the 
case forward to trial, and have, rather, obstructed defendants' and 
the court's efforts to do so in virtually every instance. Weighing 
the opportunity to move the case forward and the actions of the 
parties in doing so, the court concludes that this factor weighs 
heavily in favor of defendants. 
d. With respect to Factor (5), the Difficulty and Prejudice 
of the Parties, the court concludes that both sides of this case 
have been prejudiced by the failure to move this case toward trial. 
The court has concluded, however, that the fault for the difficulty 
and prejudice suffered by the parties is plaintiffs' in every 
instance. Plaintiffs' actions in the constant replacement of 
counsel , and attempts to delay and broaden the scope of discovery 
and issues in the case are entirely to blame for the difficulty and 
prejudice suffered by the parties. Weighing the difficulty and 
prejudice to the parties, and to the court, the court concludes 
that this factor weighs heavily in favor of defendants. 
e. With respect to Factor (6), the Injustice Which May 
Result from Dismissal, the court concludes that no injustice will 
result to the plaintiffs in this case. The issue remaining to be 
litigated in this matter is the claimed negligence and/or breach of 
contract by defendants in connection with adoption by plaintiffs of 
the minor child. The child has never been out of the plaintiffs' 
custody, and the adoption was finalized within three and one-half 
months of the making of the original claim by the natural mother to 
obtain custody. The court concludes that only minor monetary costs 
could have been incurred by plaintiffs with new counsel to finalize 
the adoption. Even these amounts are disputed by defendants as 
having been unnecessarily incurred, since Nielsen & Senior could 
have completed the adoption. The court concludes that plaintiffs 
conduct in this case had been the cause of delay, difficulty and 
prejudice suffered in this case, and that no injustice will result 
from the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. 
6. Plaintiffs' conduct constitutes abuse of the judicial 
process as set forth in Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
7. Dismissal of plaintiffs' case with prejudice and on the 
merits is justified by plaintiffs' dilatory conduct as set forth in 
Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah App. 1992). 
8. Following dismissal of plaintiffs' Complaint, the 
counterclaim of defendant Brian should be dismissed also. 
9. All other outstanding motions before the court, 
specifically, plaintiffs' Request for Admissions, plaintiff's 
Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Defendants' 
l o o ; 
Objections to Requests for Admissions, and Defendants' Motion for 
Sanctions are, likewise, rendered moot. 
10. Defendants are entitled to their costs herein incurred. 
DATED this day of , 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, JUDGEMENT OF DISMISSAL and FINDINGS OF -FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, postage prepaid to: 
Arthur J. Nielsen 
Larry L. Whyte 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorney for defendants 
60 East South Temple 
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
this j ^ a y of jllMALL DATED t i  T^ -day f {LLUJ.JIL , 1993 
S e c r e t a r y ! J 
ifcftn 
TabG 
Arthur H. Nielsen (2405) 
Larry L. Whyte (4942) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. /•£} 
Attorneys for Defendants Nielsen & Senior 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-1900 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAKES A- JOHNSON and 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation, Pat B. Brian, 
Defendants• 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 900400460CN 
Judge VeNoy Christofferson 
Pursuant to Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
through its counsel of record, Arthur H. Nielsen and Larry L. 
Whyte, Defendant Nielsen & Senior moves the Court to dismiss with 
prejudice and on the merits Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to 
prosecute their claim with diligence. This Motion is supported 
by the Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed herewith. 
^ 9 
DATED this ^)^^day of February, 1993. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
By fii J^J^ /r\ /^-m .Jo-l 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Larry L. Whyte 
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ ^ \ day of February, 1993, I 
have caused to be sent, through the United States mails, first-
class postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT addressed as follows: 
Richard C. Coxson, A5933 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
2 75 North Main 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
0,?/..^/-i ) '' 
17955.NI211.8500 
- 2 -
Arthur H. Nielsen (2405) 
Larry L. Whyte (4942) 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber (4571) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-1900 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and ; 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
v. ] 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah ] 
Corporation, Pat B. Brian, ; 
Defendants. ] 
i MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
i AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
, DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
i DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECONDED 
i AMENDED COMPLAINT 
i Civil No. 900400460CN 
I Judge VeNoy Christofferson 
Defendant Nielsen & Senior submits the following Memorandum 
in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended 
Complaint with prejudice and on the merits. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Defendants submit the following facts which are established 
by the record of this matter: 
1. In November, 1987, Plaintiffs, through their counsel, 
Mark F. Robinson, contacted Defendants to assert claims for 
several thousand dollars allegedly spent by Plaintiffs to 
finalize the adoption at issue in this case. Shortly thereafter, 
Mr. Robinson discontinued his representation of Plaintiffs. 
IT, 
'</ '«,/ JJ 
2. In August, 1988, D. David Lambert of Howard, Lewis and 
Petersen, made contact with Defendants to assert Plaintiffs' 
claims regarding the adoption. At this time, Plaintiffs were 
demanding payment of $47,000.00. Defendants met with Mr. Lambert 
to discuss the possible resolution of Plaintiffs' claims. On 
February 17, 1989, Mr. Lambert's representation of Plaintiffs was 
terminated by Plaintiffs. 
3. In 1989, Plaintiffs contacted officials of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to bring pressure to bear 
upon Defendant Brian to capitulate to Plaintiffs' demands. 
Meetings were held between Plaintiffs, Defendant Brian, and 
Church officials. During this period, Plaintiffs alternated 
claiming that they were representing themselves or that they had 
retained counsel. At this time, Plaintiffs set their claims at 
an amount in excess of $87,000.00. 
4. Plaintiffs' original complaint in this matter was 
filed, pro se, on June 22, 1990. It contained claims for 
negligence, violation of child placement laws, breach of 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation, 
intentional infliction and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress and breach of contract, and sought damages of an 
undisclosed amount. On or about July 2, 1990, Plaintiffs filed 
their first Amended Complaint, which contained the same claims 
for relief. 
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5. During the spring and summer of 1990, Plaintiffs 
claimed to be searching for legal counsel to represent them 
against Defendants. Plaintiffs publicized the matter by 
contacting scores of lawyers and law firms, sending out packets 
of information which contained, among other things, their claims 
against Defendant Brian then pending before the Utah State Bar. 
6. On or about July 13, 1990, Defendants received a letter 
from D. Lanny Waite, a Las Vegas, Nevada, attorney who claimed to 
represent Plaintiffs in this matter. Mr. Waite1s letter proposed 
settlement of the claims for $180,000.00, and expressed his 
anticipation that the media attention already given to the case 
would increase due to Judge Brian's position. Plaintiffs later 
denied that Mr. Waite represented them. 
7. Defendants answered the First Amended Complaint and on 
or about July 30, 1990, Defendant Nielsen & Senior noticed the 
Plaintiffs' depositions, to commence on August 17, 1990. On 
August 16, 1990, the day before the scheduled depositions, Jerold 
D. Conder and Peter L. Rognlie of the law firm of Conder & 
Wangsgard entered their appearance as counsel for Plaintiffs, and 
the scheduled depositions were postponed until they could become 
familiar with the case. 
8. On or about September 12, 1990, Conder & Wangsgard 
filed Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, alleging professional 
17969.NI211.8500 
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malpractice, breach of contract, negligence and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and negligent 
misrepresentation. 
9. The deposition of Plaintiff James Johnson finally began 
on November 28, 1990, more than three months after it was 
originally scheduled. The deposition lasted for three (3) days, 
until November 30, 1990, at which time a rift developed between 
Plaintiffs and their counsel over the course of the discovery and 
the case in general. The deposition was adjourned by Plaintiffs' 
counsel, indicating that Mr. Johnson was ill. 
10. On or about January 16, 1991, Conder & Wangsgard 
withdrew as counsel for Plaintiffs, and Defendant Nielsen & 
Senior sent out a notice to appoint counsel or to appear in 
person on January 18, 1991. 
11. On March 21, 1991, David R. Irvine wrote to Defendant 
Nielsen & Senior, indicating that he anticipated entering his 
appearance as counsel of record for Plaintiffs, and inquiring 
regarding a resolution of this matter by settlement. 
Notwithstanding the letter and preliminary discussions, Mr. 
Irvine did not enter an appearance for Plaintiffs as counsel in 
the case. 
12. A scheduling conference was scheduled by the Court on 
17969.NI211.8500 
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April 16, 1991. The conference was continued when Darwin C. 
Fisher of Nielsen, Hill & Fisher entered an appearance on behalf 
of Plaintiffs on April 15, 1991. 
13. A new scheduling and settlement conference was 
scheduled by the Court on June 26, 1991, in Logan, Utah. This 
conference was held, however, on July 12, 1991, and Plaintiffs' 
counsel demurred on all discussions of a resolution of the case 
due to his need to familiarize himself with the case. A 
scheduling order was entered by this Court on August 13, 1991, 
setting discovery and motion cutoff, expert witness designation 
and pretrial conference dates, and a trial date of February 3-10, 
1992. 
14. Notwithstanding Defendants' numerous attempts to 
complete Plaintiffs* depositions, continuation of the deposition 
of Plaintiff James Johnson was delayed until October 10, 1991. 
The reasons given for the delay were that Mr. Fisher was unable 
to become sufficiently familiar with facts of the case before the 
deposition. The deposition examination was finally concluded on 
October 11, 1991, almost a year after it was begun. 
15. A hearing was held in St. George, Utah on December 6, 
1991, regarding Defendants' motions to dismiss, or in the 
alternative for summary judgment as to various of the causes of 
action in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. At the hearing, 
also, the parties discussed resolution of the case. Mr. Fisher 
- 5 -
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requested delay of the trial set for February 3-10, 1992, until 
later that month. Various scheduling dates were again set, 
16. Pursuant to this Court's Order of January, 1992, 
Defendant Pat B. Brian was granted leave to file a Counterclaim. 
Upon motion of Plaintiffs' counsel, the trial date of February 
18-28, 1992, was stricken and the trial set for May 5 through 14, 
1992. 
17. In February, 1992, this Court heard Defendants' motions 
to dispose of certain causes of action in Plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint. Subsequent to this hearing, in April, 1992, 
counsel for Plaintiffs entreated the Court to strike the trial 
date set for May on the basis that discovery was still necessary 
to complete preparations for trial, that counsel could not be 
ready for the trial in so short a time, and that certain 
conflicts existed which necessitated that the date be re-set. 
Although opposed by Defendants, the motion to strike the trial 
date was granted by the Court. A new trial date was set for 
November 2-13, 1992, and the discovery cut-off date was extended 
through May, 1992. 
18. In April, 1992, counsel for Plaintiffs filed with the 
Utah Supreme Court a petition for permission to appeal an 
interlocutory order of the trial Court with regard to its rulings 
dismissing certain causes of action in Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint. On April 7, 1992, this Court entered an order 
- 6 -
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striking the scheduling order, and continuing the trial, without 
date. The Utah Supreme Court denied the Plaintiffs' petition on 
May 21, 1992. 
19. During discovery proceedings, Plaintiff gave notice of 
taking the deposition of Lizanne Magleby. On the date scheduled, 
Ms. Magleby did not appear. Counsel agreed to reschedule the 
deposition. Thereafter, Plaintiffs cancelled Ms. Magleby's 
deposition. 
20. Thereafter, Defendants noticed the taking of the 
deposition of Ms. Magleby, whereupon Plaintiffs refused to 
cooperate in making Ms. Magleby available for the deposition. 
Defendants were required to obtain leave of the Court to depose 
Ms. Magleby after the discovery cut-off, notwithstanding that it 
was Plaintiff's dilatory conduct which delayed the scheduling of 
the deposition. The deposition was set for June 30, 1990. 
Plaintiffs moved, again, to delay on the grounds that their 
counsel would be unable to attend. The matter was argued to the 
court on June 25, 1992, and an Order entered that the deposition 
proceed as scheduled. 
21. Plaintiffs have taken no action to move this case 
forward since Plaintiffs took the deposition of Brent Hoggan in 
February, 1992, approximately one year ago. 
22. The deposition of Ms. Magleby, by Defendants, was the 
last action on the case. 
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23. On or about October 5, 1992, Darwin C. Fisher moved for 
a leave to withdraw as Plaintiffs counsel. Defendant Brian 
opposed the Motion, arguing that further delay, prejudicial to 
Defendants, would ensue. Mr. Fisher's Motion was granted and the 
appearance of Richard Coxson as counsel for Plaintiffs was 
acknowledged by the Court on November 19, 1992. 
24. Defendants have not asked for a continuance at any time 
during these protracted proceedings and have consistently 
represented to the Court their readiness for trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
PLAINTIFFS' DILATORY CONDUCT WARRANTS 
DISMISSAL OF THEIR CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS 
Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, empowers this 
Court to dismiss an action, with prejudice and on the merits, for 
failure of the Plaintiff to prosecute. "The burden is upon the 
Plaintiff to prosecute a case in due course without unusual or 
unreasonable delay." Charlie Brown Construction Co., Inc. v. 
Leisure Sports Incorporated, 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App. 1987) 
(quoting Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. v. Amity Mutual Irrigation 
Co., 698 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Colo. 1985)). Plaintiffs must 
"prosecute their claims with due diligence, or accept the penalty 
of dismissal." Id., (quoting Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323, 
1325 (Utah 1975)). Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a 
decision within the broad discretion of the trial court. Id. 
- 8 -
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The Court of Appeals has held that it will not interfere with the 
trial court's decision unless it clearly appears that the Court 
has abused its discretion and that there is a likelihood that 
injustice resulted. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court provided the trial courts with 
guidance on Rule 41(b) dismissals in Westinghouse Electrical 
Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 
(Utah 1975). In that case, the Court reviewed a Rule 41(b) 
dismissal for failure to prosecute and identified the factors to 
be considered in determining whether such a dismissal is 
appropriate. Those factors were articulated recently by the 
Court of Appeals as follows: 
The Westinghouse court delineated five factors in 
addition to the length of time elapsed to determine the 
propriety of a dismissal for failure to prosecute: (1) 
the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each 
party has had to move the case forward; (3) what each 
party has done to move the case forward; (4) the amount 
of difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to 
the other side; and (5) "most important, whether 
injustice may result from the dismissal." 
Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 
(Utah App. 1991). The following facts of Plaintiffs' conduct are 
undisputed and establish that dismissal is proper, pursuant to 
Westinghouse. 
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A. Plaintiffs' conduct has repeatedly delayed the movement of 
this matter to trial while Defendants have consistently 
moved the case forward. 
As the facts of this Memorandum illustrate, Plaintiffs have 
failed to move the case forward. Plaintiffs have been 
represented by numerous attorneys in this matter, the withdrawal 
of each resulting in delay. Plaintiffs have amended their 
Complaint twice, and have, three times, requested a continuance 
of a trial setting. Plaintiff James Johnson's deposition was 
rescheduled several times and finally completed more than a year 
after noticed. In April, 1992, Plaintiffs filed with the Utah 
Supreme Court a petition for interlocutory appeal, which required 
that the fourth trial setting for November, 1992, be stricken. 
Although the petition was denied and Plaintiffs were free to 
proceed with their case, Plaintiffs have taken no action at all 
since February, 1992. 
Even this abbreviated listing of facts demonstrates the 
Plaintiffs' lack of determination to move the case forward to 
trial. Defendants, however, have proceeded with the case, 
pursuing discovery, narrowing the issues for trial by Motion, and 
consistently representing to the Court their readiness for trial. 
Defendants have moved the case forward whenever there has been 
opportunity to do so. 
17969.N1211.8500 
- 10 -
B. Plaintiffs' failure to prosecute the case with diligence 
caused difficulty and prejudice to Defendants, 
Plaintiffs' numerous changes of counsel, amendments to 
pleadings, reluctant compliance with Defendants* discovery 
requests and inability to go forward with trial when set have 
greatly increased Defendants* burden of defending this action. 
Defendants have been deprived of the benefits of a prompt 
resolution of the claims against them. Delay has made the 
presentation of evidence at trial more difficult, prejudicing 
Defendants, whose defenses require the accurate testimony of 
third parties who may become unavailable with the passage of 
time. Further, delay has unnecessarily increased the cost of 
defense. 
Defendants have lived more than five and one-half years with 
the Plaintiffs' threats and harrassment. Defendants have 
prepared to respond to Plaintiffs' claims on the merits but 
Plaintiffs have stalled every effort to place the matter before 
the Court• 
C. Dismissal will not result in injustice to Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs must diligently prosecute their claims or accept 
the penalty of dismissal. Charlie Brown Construction Co., Inc. 
v. Leisure Sports Incorporated, 740 P.2d at 1370. Such dismissal 
is not unjust when it is Plaintiffs' conduct alone that invites 
dismissal or could have avoided it. The Plaintiffs in this case 
have shown no determination to get their claims resolved on the 
- 11 -
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merits. Presumably, they are aware of the consequences of their 
lack of diligence. 
Defendants acknowledge that this Court must "balance the 
need to expedite litigation and efficiently utilize judicial 
resources with the need to allow parties to have their day in 
court." Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 P.2d 
1216, 1219 (Utah App. 1991). Notwithstanding, when the facts of 
this matter are evaluated against the factors set forth in 
Westinghouse, dismissal is, clearly, just. 
II 
DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE WOULD BE CONSISTENT 
WITH PRIOR DECISIONS OF UTAH COURTS 
In Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1989), the 
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of Maxfield's 
Complaint for lack of prosecution. The facts considered by the 
Court were these: The plaintiff filed his Complaint in 1980 and 
amended it twice, each time adding new theories of the case. Id. 
at 239. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment three times and 
filed an interlocutory appeal for the trial Court's refusal to 
grant it. The appeal was denied by the Supreme Court. Two of 
plaintiff's attorneys withdrew from representation. Plaintiffs 
objected to all three of the trial dates set. When plaintiff 
moved to amend the Complaint a third time and, at the same time, 
his third attorney moved to withdraw, the trial court dismissed 
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the action for failure to prosecute the action in a timely 
manner. Id. 
The Court of Appeals reviewed the facts in light of the_ 
Westinghouse factors, stating that "there is more to consider in 
determining if a dismissal for failure to prosecute is proper 
than merely the amount of time elapsed since the suit was filed." 
Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d at 237 (quoting Westinghouse 
Electrical Supply Co., 544 P.2d at 879). With regard to the 
issue of injustice, the- court held: 
[W]hile we recognize that injustice could result 
from dismissal of this case, in that Maxfield will lose 
whatever interest he may have in the disputed property 
without having the opportunity to argue his case on its 
merits, we conclude that he had more than ample 
opportunity to prove his asserted interest and simply 
failed to do so. Such nonaction is inexcusable, not 
only from the standpoint of the parties, but also 
because it constitutes abuse of the judicial process. 
Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d at 240-241. It is apparent that 
the court did not eguate the activity in the case with timely 
prosecution. 
The special concurrence of Judge Orme is particularly 
pertinent to the case at hand. The concurring opinion identified 
the following conduct of plaintiff as determinative: 
Maxfield's latest counsel's motion for leave to 
withdraw coupled with his motion for leave to file yet 
another amended complaint constituted, taken together, 
a concession by Maxfield that he was nowhere near being 
ready to try his case in the matter for a few days even 
though the action had been pending for the better part 
of a decade. It is the length of time this action had 
been pending, coupled with Maxfield's obvious 
17969-*1211.8500 
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unreadiness that makes sua sponte dismissal appropriate 
in this case. 
Maxfield v. Rushtonf 779 P.2d at 241. 
Plaintiffs began a course of threats and harrassment toward 
Defendants nearly five and one-half years ago. Defendants 
received demands for payment, by Plaintiffs or by counsel on 
their behalf, for nearly three years before the original 
Complaint was filed. The action has been pending for two and 
one-half years, during which time Defendants have diligently 
prepared for trial. Plaintiffs have not prepared for trial, but 
have pressed Defendants with their demands for ever increasing 
amounts of damages. Defendants are entitled to an end to 
threats, by resolution of this matter. 
This Court is, also, entitled to relief. As in Maxfield. 
Plaintiffs' nonaction is inexcusable not only from Defendants' 
standpoint, but because it constitutes abuse of the judicial 
process. Dismissal, therefore, would be consistent with the 
precedents of the Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. 
The Westinghouse factors remain the standard governing 
dismissal, whether the trial court dismisses, sua sponte, an 
action for failure to prosecute, pursuant to Rule 4-103, or upon 
motion, pursuant to Rule 41(b). Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State 
University, 813 P.2d 1216 1219 (Utah App. 1991). As Defendants 
have demonstrated above, an examination of the facts of this case 
in light of those factors supports dismissal of this action with 
- 14 -
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prejudice and on the merits. It is within this Court's 
discretion to grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
Resolution of this matter is long overdue. For the reasons 
set forth above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' 
Complaint for failure to prosecute should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of February, 1993. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Arthnr H. Nielsen 
Larry L. Whyte 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber 
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & 
Senior 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of February, 1993, I 
have caused to be sent, through the United States mails, first-
class postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECONDED AMENDED COMPLAINT 
addressed as follows: 
Richard C. Coxson, A5933 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
275 North Main 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
TI^A/JU^AMP 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and JENNIFER 
L. JOHNSON, 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
v s . 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
corporation, PAT B. BRIAN 
and CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
Civil No. 900400460CN 
The Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Extend Discovery. 
Discovery seems to have been a problem all of the way through 
this extended trial in attempting to get it to Court. There have 
been extension after extension, the Court finally issued its 
Order fixing a discovery cut-off date with the exception of 
LizAnne Magelby's deposition as stipulated by counsel. The Court 
does not plan to deviate any further from the Order that sets 
discovery cut-off dates. No exception will be given. 
1 
Therefore, the Motion to Extend Discovery is denied. 
Counsel for Defendants is directed to prepare an appropriate 
Order. Forward same to the Court with a stamped, self-addressed 
envelope and it will be returned, 
DATED this Mk day of Mafcr, 19#2, 
VENOY CHI 
SENIOR DISTRICT'JUpGE 
2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this <35tL day of May, 
1992, I mailed true and correct copies of the above and foregoing 
Memorandum Decision, first-class postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Darwin C. Fisher, Esq. 
3319 North University #200 
Provo, UT 84 604 
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq. 
Larry L. Whyte, Esq. 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. 
915 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84104 
Cdii^pu ^Mr^ 
3 
Tab I 
Arthur H. Nie l sen (A2405) RLED -> ' { 
Larry L. Whyte (4942) ounh Judicial District Court 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P .C. M Utah C6un5t*-?SS°JMrL 
Attorneys for Defendant N i e l s e n & Senior Af!MA B. $ M 0 J * ' ^ ' e ' K 
60 East South Temple _ 'ESZ3?7 Deputy 
Eagle Gate Tower, S u i t e 1100 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 532-1900 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and JENNIFER 
L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
corporation; PAT B. BRIAN, and 
CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
EXTENDING DISCOVERY CUT-OFF 
Civil No.: 900400460CN 
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen 
This matter, having come on before the above-entitled Court, 
on the 3rd day of April, 1992, by telephone conference on 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Discovery Cut-off, Darwin C. Fisher 
of Hill, Hill & Fisher, representing the Plaintiffs, Michael L. 
Dowdle, representing Defendant Pat B. Brian, and Arthur H. 
Nielsen and Larry L. Whyte of Nielsen & Senior representing 
Defendant Nielsen & Senior, and the Court having heard arguments 
of counsel and having read the records and files herein, and 
being fully advised in the premises, 
11998 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all discovery 
relating, pertaining to or arising out of Plaintiffs' Complaint 
shall be completed by May 1, 1992. 
DATED this / day of /til </, 1992. 
Approved as to form: 
Darwin C. Fisher 
HILL, HILL & FISHER 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
BY THE COUR'p: 
/ 
Honorable Ve, 
k± 
iNoy Christoffersen 
pw*dtot& 
Michael L. Docile 
Counsel for Defendant Brian 
Arthdr Y^c Nielsen 
Larry L. Whyte 
Counsel for Nie l sen & Sen ior 
11998 
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CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the cyC/LI> day of April, 1992, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER EXTENDING 
DISCOVERY CUT-OFF by causing the same to be sent via first class 
mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Darwin C. Fisher, Esq, 
HILL, HILL & FISHER 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. 
915 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
\ 
•it 
' / / N f / ^ ' s t , ^ r y ^/^ 
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Darwin C. Fisher, Bar No. 1080 
HILL, HILL & FISHER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and ] 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation and PAT B. BRIAN, 
Defendants. 
I MOTION TO EXTEND DISCOVERY 
i Civil No. 900400460CN 
i Judge VeNoy Christofferson 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs James A. Johnson and Jennifer L. 
Johnson, by and through their attorney of record, Darwin C. Fisher, 
and moves this Court for an Order to extend the discovery date on 
the grounds that: 
1. Depositions of the natural mother, Lizanne Magleby, and 
Defendant's expert witness, L. Brent Hoggan, were unable to be 
taken by the Plaintiff prior to the discovery cut-off. 
This Motion is based upon the records and files herein and the 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Affidavits filed herewith. 
n i'- \) 
r- f 
i.'Y 3 lt 1 - : 
i aaa 
DATED this /T day of A/i^LOy , 1992, 
DARWIN C. FISHER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I personally mailed a copy of the 
foregoing on this /J* day of JA&<r
 § 1992, by 
first-class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
c/o Michael Dowdle 
915 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Arthur Nielsen 
Larry Whyte 
Nielsen & Senior 
60 E. South Temple #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Judge VeNoy Christofferson 
875 Rio Virgin, #217 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Jcimes A. and Jennifer L. Johnson 
L:\CLIENTDF\DAVISSTV.ADO\discexte.mot 
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Darwin C. Fisher, Bar No. 1080 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A* JOHNSON and 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, ] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation and PAT B. BRIAN, 
Defendants, 
| AFFIDAVIT OF 
) DARWIN C. FISHER 
I Civil No. 900400460CN 
1 Judge VeNoy Christofferson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss: 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Darwin C. Fisher, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states: 
1. I am the attorney for the Plaintiffs in the above 
entitled matter. 
2. I am of adult years and competent to make this Affidavit. 
All the statements hereinafter set forth in this Affidavit are made 
by me on the basis of my personal and direct knowledge of the 
matter to which said statements pertain. If called as a witness by 
1 
L~i tj 1Z i ii .*--
a Court of competent jurisdiction, I am able and shall testify as 
to each and all of said matters in the manner hereinafter set forth 
in this Affidavit* 
3. I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the 
State of Utah and am over the age of 18 years. 
4. I was informed that Mr. L. Brent Hoggan, the defendants' 
expert witness, would not be available for the taking of his 
deposition until the last week of April, 1992. 
5. That your affiant contacted Mr. Whyte, counsel for 
Nielsen & Senior, and was told that defendants would not agree to 
an extension of the discovery cut-off date and the deposition of 
Mr. Hoggan must be taken within the last week of April, 1992 prior 
to May 1, 1992. 
6. That your affiant informed Mr. Whyte that he would make 
every effort in order to take Mr. Hoggan's deposition, however, 
your affiant was in trial from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. After 5:00 
p.m. your affiant was occupied in preparing for the next day's 
trial. That your affiant was unable to take the deposition during 
the last week of April, 1992, because of your affiant's involvement 
in trial in another matter. 
1. That defendants' counsel was fully aware that your 
affiant was to be involved in the jury trial from the 7th day of 
April, 1992, as defendants' counsel was working closely with the 
2 
counsel for the defendants in the other matter and knew that your 
affiant had entered an appearance to act as co-counsel in that 
matter* 
8. It is apparent to your affiant that defendants have 
prohibited the taking of the deposition of their expert witness by 
requiring the deposition to be taken the last few days of April 
1992. 
is c/ DATED this day of jdg^ ., 1992. 
Darwin C. Fisher 
v J v >*->v h^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
On this 
) 
day of „^w m, 1992, personally 
appeared before me Darwin C. Fisher, signer of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
SYLVIA A, BUNDRANT 
HOTW PUBLIC* STATE dUTAH 
3319 NORTH UMV.AVE. #200 
NiEtSONHOL&RSHER 
PROVO.UTAH 84604 
COMM. EXP. 1-20-96 
Y PUBLIC 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing on this ^r day of 
djdCl^ , 1992, to the following: 
T7 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Larry L. Whyte 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
60 East South Temple #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Pat B. Brian 
c/o Michael L. Dowdle 
915 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84104 
James A. and Jennifer L. Johnson 
and a courtesy copy of same to: 
The Honorable Venoy Christofferson 
875 Rio Virgin #217 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Wu 
la Bundrant 
1:\clientdf\davisatv.ado\af£ad6.dcf 
4 
Darwin C. Fisher, Bar No. 1080 
HILL, HILL & FISHER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and \ 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, \ 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NIELSON & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation and PAT B. BRIAN, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SYLVIA BUNDRANT 
Civil No. 900400460CN 
i Judge VeNoy Christofferson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss: 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
SYLVIA BUNDRANT, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am the paralegal/secretary for plaintiffs' counsel, 
Darwin C. Fisher* 
2. I am of adult years and competent to make this Affidavit. 
3. All the statements hereinafter set forth in this 
Affidavit are made by me on the basis of my personal and direct 
knowledge of the matter to which said statements pertain. If 
c 
• •*• l i t v,*-. 
called as a witness by a Court of competent jurisdiction, I am able 
and shall testify as to each and all of said matters in the manner 
hereinafter set forth in this Affidavit. 
4. I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the 
State of Utah and am over the age of 18 years. 
5. Your affiant tried to contact the defendants' expert 
witness, Mr. L. Brent Hoggan's secretary on the 15th day of April, 
1992, to try and set a time for his deposition. I was then 
informed by a return call from his office that he would not be 
available until the last week in April. 
6. Your affiant tried to contact the defendants' expert 
witness, Mr. Hoggan, on the 30th day of April, 1992 to try and set 
a time for his deposition and Mr. Hoggan was unavailable. 
DATED this T day of Maj-a 1992. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
On this y Wi_ 
ss. 
day of May, 1992, personally appeared before me 
Sylvia A. Bundrant, signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
NOTri^ r RJBdC 
TONYA R. ADAMS 
P.O.Box 283 
Orem. Utah 84059 
My Commission Expires. 8-22-94 
State of Utah 
SS<3?5$SSSSSSSSSSSS3SS 
\AArM~~~ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I personally mailed a copy of the 
foregoing on this yp day of A/(6M/K , 1992, by 
first-class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
c/o Mark Dowdle 
615 W. 200 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Arthur Nielsen 
Larry Whyte 
Nielsen & Senior 
60 E. South Temple #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
\clientdf\johnson\affidav.sab 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL D I S T ^ C T ' ' 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A, JOHNSON, JENNIFER 
L. JOHNSON, AND CHILD JOHNSON 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation, PAT B. BRIAN 
and CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Fourth District Case 
900400460 CN 
DATE: July 12, 1991 
HONORABLE V. Christofferson 
COURT REPORTER: Pratt, Joanne 
COURT CLERK: PAM 
TYPE OF HEARING: SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFFS, ATP FISHER, ATD DOWDLE, ATD SCHMUTZ 
ATD WHYTE, DEF ARTHUR NEILSON, DEF JUDGE BRIAN 
This is the time set for the Settlement & Pre-Trial Conference in 
the above Fourth District case. Honorable Venoy Christofferson is 
presiding, conference is held in chambers with counsel. Plaintiffs 
are present in the courtroom, but do not wish to be present in 
chambers* Jury trial dates are rescheduled to February 17-28 in the 
4th District. Status, depositions and cut off dates are discussed. 
Expert witnesses' depositions to be taken, plaintiff to notify by 
November 1, 1991 and defendants to notify by November 15, 1991. 
Discovery and Interrogatories to be completed by December 30, 1991 
and a Pre-Trial Conference to be held in St. George on January 24, 
1991 at 10:00am. Counsel to stipulate to exhibits and witnesses. 
Issues of damages and PTSS, damages shown, adoption after this 
adoption, unrelated accident also in litigation, causation, fraud, 
emotional distress and bankruptcy discussed. Motions to be filed in 
this First District Court with hearing to be set if requested. 
Attorney fees and adoption fees owing or dismissed through 
bankruptcy. Today's order to be prepared by Attorney Whyte. 
Motions for Summary Judgment may enter. 
